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THE ENERGY COSTS OF HISTORIC PRESERVATION 
 
Abstract  
We explore the impact of historic preservation policies on domestic energy consumption. Using 
panel data for England from 2006 to 2013 and employing a fixed effects strategy, we document 
that (i) rising national energy prices induce an increase in home energy efficiency installations 
and a corresponding reduction in energy consumption and (ii) this energy saving effect is 
significantly less pronounced in Conservation Areas and in places with high concentrations of 
Listed Buildings, where the adoption of energy efficiency installations is typically more costly 
and sometimes legally prevented altogether. Historic preservation policies increase private 
energy costs and the social cost of carbon per designated dwelling by around £11,600 ($19,100) 
and £2,400 ($4,000), respectively. These costs ought to be weighed against any benefits of 
preservation. 
 
JEL classification: Q48, Q54, R38, R52. 
 
Keywords: Historic preservation, land use regulation, energy efficiency,  
energy consumption, climate change. 
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1. Introduction 
Policies to preserve buildings for historical, cultural or architectural reasons are widespread 
across Europe and parts of North America. They generate both benefits and costs. While the 
external benefits—as measured by higher house prices outside of designated areas—have 
recently been well documented (Ahlfeldt et al., 2017; Been et al., 2016), we know little about 
the costs these policies generate. In this paper, we quantify the foregone energy efficiency 
savings and the corresponding social cost of carbon. We find that they are substantial. 
The theoretical mechanism is straightforward. In the absence of historic preservation policies, 
households invest in energy efficiency improvements as long as the expected private benefits 
from potential energy savings exceed the additional upfront investment costs. Preservation 
policies drive a wedge into this decision because they often mandate restrictions on the type 
and extent of changes that can be made to residential units (‘dwellings’). Restrictions on say 
the types of windows that can be installed may increase the cost of adopting energy efficiency 
technologies or may legally prevent such installations altogether. Preservation policies may 
thus directly affect the energy efficiency of affected dwellings.  
Our paper quantifies foregone energy efficiency savings by exploring the impact of historic 
preservation policies on domestic energy consumption in England. We focus on two well-
established policies: ‘Conservation Areas’, which preserve entire areas of buildings and ‘Listed 
Buildings’, which preserve individual buildings. We collate a rich panel dataset at the 
neighbourhood-level (‘Middle Layer Super Output Area’), spanning the years 2006-2013. 
During this period, energy prices, defined in our paper as a local weighted average of national 
gas and electricity prices per kilowatt hour, increased every year but one, and per capita energy 
consumption fell by around 20%.  
In Figure 1 we plot a simple cross-sectional relationship, at the neighbourhood level, between 
per capita domestic energy consumption and Listed Buildings (per 100 dwellings). It indicates 
that more preservation is correlated with lower energy consumption. However, a naïve cross-
sectional comparison does not compellingly identify the causal effect of preservation on energy 
consumption. This is partly because the prevalence of preservation is not randomly assigned 
across space. For example, Listed Buildings tend to be concentrated in older, richer and more 
urbanised areas.  
One might try to overcome these endogeneity concerns by employing a panel regression with 
dwelling fixed effects. In such a model, changes in dwelling-specific energy consumption 
would be identified by changes in a dwelling’s Listed Building-designation status (from 0 to 
1), ceteris paribus. However, such an approach is infeasible because we only have cross-
sectional neighbourhood-level data on the prevalence of historic preservation and because the 
vast bulk of preservation designations occurred before the 1990s. More importantly, it would 
fail to properly identify the full energy cost of preservation. This is because at the time of 
designation, the dwelling owners would have optimised energy efficiency, so the switch to 
designation (0 to 1) itself will not adversely affect energy efficiency and will not increase 
energy consumption. Only over time, as energy prices increase and/or energy efficiency 
technology advances, will the dwelling’s original level of energy efficiency no longer be 
optimal and the preservation-induced constraints start to bite. Owners would then want to invest 
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in energy efficiency improvements, yet the preservation-induced constraints would prevent 
them from doing so. This is what induces the energy costs of preservation and explains why 
our empirical approach focuses on changes in national energy prices over time, in a period of 
rapidly rising prices.  
Empirically, we exploit the fact that rising national energy prices shift the local demand for 
energy efficiency installations upwards, thereby reducing energy consumption, but less so in 
areas with widespread historic preservation. We capture this effect by interacting energy prices 
with the neighbourhood-level prevalence of preservation at the start of our sample period. Our 
focus on rising energy prices is therefore important for identification. When prices fall, there 
are no positive incentives to invest in energy efficiency improvements and the prevalence of 
historic preservation policies should not matter. 
Using a fixed effects approach that controls for neighbourhood specific time-invariant 
unobserved characteristics, we first document that rising national energy prices induce a 
reduction in local energy consumption. Next, we explore the sensitivity of the price elasticity 
of energy consumption with respect to the incidence of historic preservation by interacting 
energy prices with the prevalence of preservation. In our baseline specification, we control for 
location and year fixed effects, linear time-trends interacted with neighbourhood characteristics 
as well as flexible trends for each commuting zone, and the neighbourhood’s distance from the 
centre of the commuting zone. We also carefully control for the age and composition of the 
housing stock, thereby helping us to disentangle the effects of historic preservation policies 
from vintage effects. 
We demonstrate that the energy-saving effect is significantly less pronounced in Conservation 
Areas and in places with higher concentrations of Listed Buildings. Using a conservative but 
plausible energy demand price elasticity point estimate (-0.48) obtained from the data, our 
findings suggest that a one standard deviation increase in the share of dwellings in Conservation 
Areas reduces the energy price elasticity by 3.5%, while a one standard deviation increase in 
the number of Listed Buildings reduces the elasticity by 4.4%. We provide evidence that the 
mechanism for this decline is the capacity of preservation policies to limit the uptake of home 
energy efficiency improvements.  
In our empirical analysis, we face two sets of challenges that threaten a causal interpretation. 
Regarding the first set, a key concern is that the prevalence of dwellings in Conservation Areas 
and Listed Buildings may be correlated with income and other confounding factors. To address 
this concern, we first employ an alternative estimation approach, a ‘stacked regression’. This 
allows us to control for all factors that commonly affect per capita domestic electricity and gas 
consumption in each neighbourhood-year cell. Second, we directly control for the interaction 
between energy prices and a number of socioeconomic neighbourhood characteristics 
addressing, for example, the concern that higher-income residents may respond less sensitively 
to energy price hikes. Third, we add neighbourhood pair-by-year fixed effects to the baseline 
specification, where pairs are adjacent observations when ranking neighbourhoods on a number 
of candidate confounders (e.g. house prices or income), allowing us to control less 
parametrically for these possible threats to identification. Fourth, we employ a placebo test 
using a preservation policy—Green Belt designation—that does not focus on protecting 
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buildings and is not expected to affect energy efficiency investments. This allows us to test 
whether our findings might be driven by factors such as general planning restrictiveness or local 
socio-economic characteristics that correlate with extensive preservation. All these tests support 
our main findings. 
A second set of challenges centres on how we specify energy and historic preservation 
variables. In our baseline specification, we estimate the response of domestic energy (gas plus 
electricity) consumption to one year-lagged energy prices, weighting prices across the two 
energy types in our data. Yet, the timing of the response may not be lagged by one year. We 
show that changes in the panel frequency or in the lag- or lead-structure of energy prices do not 
materially affect our findings. A related issue is how we measure energy use. In addition to the 
stacked approach, which explicitly separates gas and electricity, we show that our baseline 
estimates are insensitive to using domestic gas consumption as the dependent variable, and to 
instrumenting for energy prices with North Sea gas production. Finally, we show that 
alternative specifications of our preservation variables do not alter our findings. 
Counterfactual simulations suggest that preservation policies in England during our study 
period imposed additional private costs of energy consumption with a present value of £23.2 
($38.3)1 billion and a social cost of carbon of £4.8 ($7.9) billion. With two million designated 
dwellings, this equates to roughly £11.600 ($19,100) and £2,400 ($4,000) per designated 
dwelling, respectively. Limiting Conservation Areas and Listed Buildings to 1980 levels—a 
moderate reversion that would bring back levels to a point in time when dwellings with the 
highest heritage value were likely already designated—would have lowered total domestic 
energy consumption between 2006 and 2013 by 1.3%. This amounts to a monetary saving of 
£10.3 ($16.9) billion and a carbon reduction of 8.5 million metric tons of carbon dioxide 
equivalent.  
Our paper ties into a recent literature on the house price effects of historic preservation. Ahlfeldt 
et al. (2017), like us, focus on designated Conservation Areas in England. They find that 
property price effects inside newly-designated areas are not statistically different from zero, yet 
outside of these areas, the effects are positive and significant. Been et al. (2016) explore historic 
preservation policies in New York City, also finding that properties just outside the boundaries 
of historic districts consistently increase in value after designation. The effect within these 
districts is more mixed; sometimes positive, sometimes zero. Been et al. also document a 
modest reduction in new construction in districts after designation. Finally, Koster et al. (2016) 
explore the impact of historic preservation within Dutch cities, finding that high-income 
households sort themselves into designated areas, suggesting that they have a higher willingness 
to pay for historic amenities.  
While Ahlfeldt et al. (2017) and Been et al. (2016) both suggest that historic preservation 
significantly increases prices of nearby dwellings, this does not necessarily imply that they 
increase social welfare. First, as argued for example by Glaeser (2011), excessive historic 
preservation on a wider scale may generate adverse impacts through supply restrictions that 
raise prices in an entire city or even nationwide. Second, factors other than supply constraints 
                                                 
1 Our Pound Sterling cost estimates are based on average energy unit prices for 2013. At the year-end of 2013 one 
GBP (£) was worth 1.65 USD ($). 
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can drive a wedge between house price capitalization effects and the public’s willingness to pay 
(Kuminoff and Pope, 2014). Positive price effects also do not necessarily imply positive net 
benefits because even internal benefits and costs are not always fully capitalized into prices, for 
example, when the marginal house buyer is not well informed about particular benefits or costs 
associated with the location or dwelling (Hilber, 2017). Third, and most crucially, not all 
externalities are capitalised into property prices. One example is that some people may value 
the sheer existence of a historic building—such as the Cathedral of Notre Dame in Paris—even 
if they do not live close by. Our study highlights another: historic preservation limits energy 
efficient home improvements, thereby increasing energy consumption and generating 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. 
Our paper is also related to a growing literature on the energy and climate impacts of land use 
regulations. Glaeser and Kahn (2010) document a strong negative association between carbon 
dioxide emissions and land use regulations and point out that restricting new development in 
the cleanest areas effectively pushes new development towards places with higher emissions. 
Larson et al. (2012) trace the energy footprint of transportation, housing and land use policies, 
highlighting that, counterintuitively, minimum lot zoning may reduce energy consumption 
because it drives up the price of housing and causes household densities in the unregulated, 
inner parts of the city to rise. Finally, Larson and Yezer (2015) demonstrate that density limits 
and Green Belts can positively or negatively affect both city welfare and energy use. Our 
contribution to this literature is the careful empirical identification of energy consumption 
effects of historic preservation policies. To our knowledge, we are the first to evaluate and 
quantify the energy and climate costs of such policies.  
Our findings have important implications for climate policy. In the UK, this is guided by the 
2008 Climate Change Act, which legislates for an ambitious 100% (or ‘net zero’) reduction in 
GHG emissions by 2050. The ‘least-cost path’ to this target entails a major contribution from 
energy efficiency improvements in buildings, including designated dwellings. Our findings 
indicate that the extent of historic preservation in England signifies a considerable obstacle to 
achieving such an ambitious target. More generally, by demonstrating that preservation limits 
the uptake of home energy efficiency improvements, we contribute to a literature that seeks to 
understand the low apparent uptake of energy efficient durables (Allcott and Greenstone, 2012; 
Fowlie et al., 2015). Finally, another measure by which the UK hopes to meet its target is via a 
carbon tax, known as the Carbon Floor Price. Currently frozen at £18 ($30) per metric ton of 
carbon dioxide, this is projected to increase 'rapidly' after 2020. Our results suggest that 
individuals living in designated dwellings are unlikely to respond to a rising tax in the same 
manner as those living in non-designated dwellings.  
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the institutional setting and provide 
some theoretical considerations. The subsequent section describes the data, discusses our 
baseline specifications and presents our main results along with robustness checks and evidence 
of the proposed mechanism driving the results. In Section 4 we conduct a counterfactual 
analysis to provide a quantitative interpretation of our findings. Section 5 considers welfare 
implications. The final section concludes. 
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2. Institutional Setting and Theoretical Considerations 
2.1.  Historic Preservation Policies: Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas 
The British ‘development control’ land use planning system dates back to the Town and 
Country Planning Act of 1947. Its main aim is urban containment. This is achieved through 
horizontal constraints on urban development (‘green belts’), as well as vertical constraints 
(mainly height limits and ‘view corridors’). Another characteristic of the system is the almost 
complete lack of fiscal incentives at local level to permit residential development (Hilber and 
Vermeulen, 2016). Britain’s planning system differs starkly from the American zoning system 
or even the Continental European master planning system. In contrast to both of these systems, 
which are rule-based, Britain’s planning system arbitrarily expropriates development rights. 
Each change of use of any land parcel (e.g., constructing a garage) has to undergo a rigorous 
local planning application process, which includes a consultation with neighbours. As such, 
there are no areas ‘zoned’ for residential purposes and any new development is subject to local 
political calculations. Even minor alterations are subject to ‘Nimbyism’ thus making the system 
very restrictive and uncertain in nature.  
Britain’s historic preservation policies are embedded within this planning system. Indeed, the 
preservation policies add a further layer of restrictiveness. Similar to ‘historic district’ 
designation in New York City (Been et al., 2016), ‘Conservation Areas’ were established to 
protect certain areas (typically urban or the core of a village) of special historic or architectural 
interest. The ‘Listed Buildings’ policy is a more radical form of preservation of entire individual 
buildings, i.e., of both the façade and the interior of a building. This policy is perhaps even 
more radical than the ‘landmark status’ applied to some properties in New York City. Such 
properties are subject to regulations that protect their historic nature while allowing owners to 
continue to use and maintain their properties. 
The British historic preservation policies date back to 1953 for Listed Buildings (the Historic 
Buildings and Monuments Act) and 1967 for Conservation Areas (the Civic Amenities Act), 
although the current legislation in England and Wales is the Planning (Listed Buildings and 
Conservation Areas) Act 1990. According to Historic England, Grade I Listed Buildings are of 
“exceptional interest”, Grade II* are of “particular importance” and Grade II are of “special 
interest”. Less than 0.5% of all Listed Buildings were built after 1945; about a third was built 
in each of the 18th and 19th Centuries. Over 90% of all Listed Buildings have Grade II status. 
Conservation Areas protect whole areas of buildings rather than just individual buildings, and 
Listed Buildings can be found in Conservation Areas.  
Figure 2 shows the distribution of Conservation Areas in England from data collected by 
Historic England in 2008 and 2012, at the Local Planning Authority scale. The time trend in 
the total number of Conservation Areas since the late-1960s is shown in Figure 3. There are 
currently just over 8,000 such areas, containing around two million dwellings, out of a total 
housing stock of some 23 million dwellings as of 2014. The 1970s and 1980s witnessed rapid 
growth in the designation of new Conservation Areas before tailing off in the 1990s. Similar to 
Conservation Areas, Listed Buildings are distributed all over England (Figure 4). After rapid 
growth in the 1980s, the designation of new Listed Buildings also plateaued in the 1990s, at 
around 0.3 to 0.4 million Listed Buildings (Figure 5). 
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2.2.  The Role of Historic Preservation Policies for Home Energy Efficiency Improvements  
  and Implications for Energy Consumption 
Historic preservation policies protect the heritage of the built environment by restricting the 
development or modernisation of specific dwellings. The policies’ economic rationale centres 
on the external value of heritage, which is often enjoyed by individuals other than those owning 
or occupying designated dwellings. It may too solve coordination failure.2 However, 
preservation policies also impose costs, both private and social. Higher private costs of energy 
consumption materialise, for example, when households living in designated dwellings incur 
additional investment costs in order to comply with policy standards. Households are also 
typically restricted in the extent to which they can reconfigure, redevelop, or alter the fabric of 
designated dwellings. One particular implication of preservation-induced restrictions is that 
they may impede energy efficiency installations and thus increase the private costs of energy 
consumption and the social costs associated with negative externalities.  
Table 1 illustrates the main restrictions on undertaking specific energy efficiency improvements 
for dwellings affected by the policies. In many Conservation Areas, planning consents are 
required for external improvement projects. For example, many Conservation Areas are subject 
to locally-imposed regulations, known as ‘Article 4 Directions’, which limit specific 
development rights such as making changes to windows or frontages. In contrast, outside 
Conservation Areas, external improvement projects do not require planning permission (i.e., 
they are ‘permitted developments’). For Listed Buildings, the requirements are much stricter – 
as well as planning permission, changes require a separate consent known as a ‘Listed Building 
consent’ – and the restrictions also cover internal upgrades, e.g. cavity wall insulation. The 
planning guidance even states that households living in a Listed Building must consult with 
planning authorities before installing a new heating system or boiler. Thus, owners of Listed 
Buildings face additional delays (through planning consultations, and the planning process), 
potential costs (through planning fees, and pre-application fees) and uncertainty (through 
planning decisions), even for the simplest energy efficiency upgrades to their homes.   
Some restrictions imposed by preservation policies may not prevent home energy efficiency 
improvements altogether but are likely to drive up costs. For instance, a homeowner living in a 
Conservation Area wishing to install new, energy-efficient windows needs to ensure that they 
are consistent not only with the character of the owner’s dwelling but also with that of the 
surrounding buildings. Often, this obliges owners to install expensive timber windows, rather 
than much less costly and more energy-efficient aluminium or uPVC windows.3 For Listed 
Buildings, this issue is compounded both because of the additional range of installations subject 
to planning authority consent, and the tighter nature of the approval process. We are not aware 
of any major changes to the restrictions during our sample period. While there could be local 
                                                 
2 Holman and Ahlfeldt (2015) point out that even if heritage value is fully capitalised into property prices, 
coordination failure is likely. This is because individual homeowners may be tempted to inappropriately alter their 
dwelling, thus free-riding on the historic character of nearby properties.  
3 Timber windows are typically twice as expensive as uPVC alternatives. In a public consultation about a 
Conservation Area in London, residents opposing the Conservation Area policy of timber replacement windows 
quoted replacement costs for a single timber window of £4,000 to £5,000 ($6,600 to $8,250), 
https://www.harrow.gov.uk/www2/documents/s61817/Revised%20PWPE_Appendix1.pdf.  
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variation in the application of exemptions applied in Conservation Areas (Article 4 Directions), 
such variation is likely to be small because the rules are essentially the same across England.   
Figure 6 illustrates the proposed theoretical mechanism and its implications for the demand 
price elasticity and resulting energy consumption. The figure depicts two markets: a local 
energy market (Panel A) and a local market for energy efficiency installations (Panel B). Now 
consider an international or national negative shock to energy supply (e.g., a sudden decrease 
in oil and/or gas production) that raises the national energy price 𝑝𝑒. In Panel A of Figure 6, 
this equates to an upward shift of the energy supply curve and a corresponding increase in the 
price of energy. In the absence of preservation policies, local energy consumers respond to this 
shock in two ways. First, the price increase provides greater incentives to save more energy 
(e.g. by turning down the heating thermostat). Second, the price increase provides greater 
incentives to invest in home energy efficiency installations as it makes such installations more 
beneficial. In the market for home energy efficiency installations—depicted in Panel B of 
Figure 6—this equates to an increase in the demand for installations, resulting in greater energy 
efficiency and consequently less energy consumption, all else equal.  
Now consider an identical consumer, with identical utility function, who lives in an identical 
neighbourhood in terms of amenities and housing stock but with one difference: the 
neighbourhood has a strict historic preservation policy that prevents new home energy 
efficiency installations altogether, implying a perfectly inelastic supply curve—illustrated in 
Panel B of Figure 6—in the market for such installations. Even though the energy price shock 
will also induce an increase in demand for installations, the policy prevents an uptake of more 
installations and hence, prevents an increase in energy efficiency. Consumers in the preserved 
location will still reduce their energy consumption, but less so, all else equal, than those in the 
non-preserved location. In the energy market, consumers in the preserved location thus have a 
more price inelastic demand for energy, illustrated in Panel A of Table 5. The supply price 
shock will induce additional energy savings—effect  in the figure—but not an additional 
reduction of energy consumption as a consequence of additional energy efficiency 
installations—effect  in the figure. The reduction in energy consumption (effects +) will 
be greater for consumers in the non-preserved neighbourhood, by the amount of .  
2.3. Energy Price Dynamics and Path Dependency 
While our theoretical considerations above are based on a static setting and are independent of 
the path of past energy price dynamics, our empirical analysis is dynamic in nature and the 
response of households to positive national energy price shocks can be expected to be path 
dependent; past energy price hikes drive earlier investment decisions and determine the stock 
and nature of existing energy efficiency installations. Moreover, the energy consumption-
response to a price shock will depend on the availability and cost-effectiveness of energy 
efficiency installations at the point in time when a shock occurs. Our findings should be 
interpreted in this context.  
Figure 7 documents that UK energy prices rose quickly between the mid-1970s and the early-
1980s, but then fell steadily until 2006—the start of our panel. During this period of falling 
prices, there were several developments in energy efficiency technologies, including the 
widespread availability of loft and cavity wall insulation, and the introduction of uPVC-
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windows, while the energy efficiency of windows and boilers has been continuously improving 
over the last few decades. In sum, households in 2006 could access several technologies that 
were either unavailable or not cost-effective during the last comparable period of sustained 
energy price rises, from the mid-1970s to early-1980s. We thus anticipate a reasonably large 
scope for energy efficiency upgrades in response to rising prices during our sample period. 
3. Empirical Analysis 
3.1. Data 
No dataset for England combines—or could combine—domestic energy consumption, the 
prevalence of preservation policies, and the uptake of home energy efficiency installations at 
the same geographic scale. Therefore, our empirical analysis focuses on two different spatial 
scales by constructing two panels for the period 2006-2013. The first combines measures of the 
prevalence of preservation policies with home energy consumption at neighbourhood-level, 
while the second combines the same policy measures, but with measures of the uptake of home 
energy efficiency installations at planning authority-level. We briefly describe the data below 
and display summary statistics for the two panels in Tables 2a and 2b. Appendix A provides 
full details. 
The first panel describes domestic energy consumption per person, prevalence of preservation 
policies, and various control variables at neighbourhood-level. Our neighbourhoods are Middle 
Layer Super Output Areas, small area statistical units introduced after the 2001 Census. Each 
contains between 2,000 and 6,000 households. The domestic energy consumption per person4 
variable is generated at the neighbourhood-spatial scale by linking sub-national consumption 
statistics from the Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC) to annual population 
data from the Office of National Statistic (ONS). Our dependent variable sums energy 
consumption across electricity and mains gas (i.e. gas supplied by pipelines)—the two fuel 
types available in neighbourhood-level data.5  
The second panel is constructed at planning authority-level by combining data on home energy 
efficiency installations from the Home Energy Efficiency Database (HEED) held by the Energy 
Saving Trust with our measures of historic preservation and control variables. Because counts 
of home energy efficiency installations are unavailable at a finer spatial scale, by necessity the 
spatial units in this panel are England’s 354 pre-2009 planning authorities.6 This panel runs 
only from 2006 to 2010. The HEED data records a variety of installations including wall 
insulations, loft insulations, double glazing, new boilers, new heating systems, micro-
generation and energy efficient lighting. We treat these installations as a stock-measure 
                                                 
4 Households are not counted at neighbourhood-level and therefore we are unable to standardise by household. 
5 Some neighbourhood appear to have unfeasibly large year-to-year changes in energy consumption. These could 
plausibly result from measurement error or factors we do not observe, e.g. new connections to the gas pipeline. To 
ensure these outliers do not drive our results, in our main regressions we drop neighbourhood-year cells where 
domestic energy consumption, gas, or electricity consumption are missing or change by more than 25% between 
years. Together these cells comprise around 2.5% of our original sample. As we show later, this strategy is 
conservative: estimates increase in magnitude when these outliers are retained. 
6 Given missing Conservation Area-data for some planning authorities, we run regressions on 304 of the 354 
planning authorities.   
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(because the upgrades we focus on are mostly durable) and in our baseline specifications we 
specify dependent variables based on installations in levels, controlling for household counts.  
The HEED data do not contain domestic energy consumption, so we utilise a third panel dataset 
to illustrate the impact of some of the most common types of home energy efficiency 
installations on domestic energy consumption. The National Energy Efficiency Database 
(NEED)—compiled by DECC between 2005 and 2012—does not contain geographical 
identifiers at the dwelling scale. This precludes it from further analysis with respect to historic 
preservation policies. NEED contains data for energy consumption and some household and 
dwelling characteristics for almost four million dwellings in England.  
Despite the differences in spatial scale, there are some commonalities across the first two panels 
and the corresponding empirical specifications we estimate. In both cases, the demand shifters 
we utilise are based on the national real price of domestic energy per kilowatt hour (kWh) 
provided by DECC. In our main specifications, we lag this price by a year because domestic 
energy consumers are arguably likely to take time to respond to changes in the price of energy, 
for example, in order to select and install energy efficiency measures.7  
National gas and electricity prices are weighted by the local share of each type of energy 
consumed in 2005. Using national energy prices as a demand shifter for energy efficiency 
installations has two advantages. First, national prices can be considered exogenous from the 
perspective of property owners and for the purpose of our empirical analysis. Second, there is 
no block energy pricing in the UK, which allows us to sidestep problems due to simultaneity 
between prices and consumption.8 The cost of gas and electricity hardly varies across the UK, 
presumably because consumers can switch between suppliers. Figure 8 shows national gas and 
electricity prices in real terms along with North Sea gas production. Both prices remained 
relatively flat between 1990 and 2003, before rising rapidly until 2013. The rise in energy prices 
coincided with a dramatic decline in North Sea gas production as profitable reserves dwindled.  
Our principal preservation variables rely on the estimated proportion of residential addresses in 
each neighbourhood or planning authority that are covered by each of the policies. For both, 
the denominator is calculated from counts of residential addresses for each postcode in England. 
For Listed Buildings the numerator is the count of Grade II Listed Buildings in the 
neighbourhood or planning authority.9 For Conservation Areas the numerator is calculated by 
allocating postcodes to polygons using shapefiles provided by Historic England and postcode 
                                                 
7 We test alternative assumptions in our robustness checks (Section 3.5). 
8 See Ito (2014) and Reiss and White (2005) for recent contributions that discuss how non-linear pricing schedules 
can cause problems in the estimation of energy demand elasticities and ways to resolve these issues. 
9 We use Grade II Listed Buildings only and not the higher grades (Grade II* and Grade I) because the latter are 
less likely to be in residential use. To support this claim, we examine the proportion of churches in the data using 
textual analysis of the Listed Building names. We assume churches contain the words “Church” or “Cathedral” 
but do not contain a number (typically a street address) or the words “Street”, “Cottage”, or “House”. This approach 
suggests that churches represent 3% of Grade II Listed Buildings but 31% of Grade II* and Grade I Listed 
Buildings. The resulting measure – Grade II Listed Buildings per 100 dwellings –  proxies for the local prevalence 
of residential Listed Buildings, which we are unable to observe directly. Alternative measures of Listed Buildings 
that attempt to exclude non-residential Listed Buildings based on text contained in the address field, are tested in 
Web Appendix Table 1; results are very similar to those generated when using our chosen measure. 
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centroids. Alternative measures are constructed from the same underlying data for robustness 
checks (see Appendices A and B). 
3.2. Identification Strategy 
We empirically test the extent to which historic preservation policies influence domestic energy 
consumption per capita and investments in home energy efficiency installations. Our focus is 
on dynamic effects because preservation policies reduce the viability or restrict the ability of 
households to respond to energy price shocks by installing energy efficiency measures.  
The empirical set-up we adopt is consistent across the two panels (neighbourhood- and planning 
authority scale) to the extent feasible. We focus on describing the research design for the 
neighbourhood-level analysis of domestic energy consumption per capita, indicating any 
differences for the planning authority home energy efficiency panel below. The neighbourhood 
level panel is composed of all neighbourhoods in England (indexed by subscript i) spanning the 
years 2006 to 2013 (indexed by subscript t).  
We first obtain benchmark estimates of the energy price elasticity:  
 e𝑖𝑗𝑟𝑡 = β1p𝑡−𝑚 + α1w𝑗𝑡 + α2hdd𝑡 + γ𝑖 + ∑ δ𝑟D𝑟
9
𝑟=1 t + ε𝑖𝑗𝑟𝑡. (1) 
We regress the natural log of domestic energy consumption per capita 𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑟𝑡 on the log national 
weighted real energy price demand shifter lagged by m periods 𝑝𝑡−𝑚 and on neighbourhood 
fixed effects γi. Following the literature (e.g., Aroonruengsawat et al., 2012) we also include 
log local wages w𝑗𝑡 (measured at the planning authority level (denoted j) since time-varying 
wage data are unavailable at the neighbourhood-level) and national atmospheric conditions 
measured by log heating degree days hdd𝑡 to reflect that local income and weather conditions 
may influence domestic energy consumption. Energy prices vary at the national level. 
Therefore, we are unable to include year fixed effects in this regression. Instead, we allow for 
regional trends by interacting linear time trends with dummy indicators for the nine English 
regions, denoted D𝑟. Our theoretical priors are that, all else equal, consumers will respond to 
higher energy prices by reducing energy consumption so that the price elasticity will be negative 
(β1 < 0).
     
In subsequent regressions we explore the effect of historic preservation policies on price 
elasticities by interacting the energy price demand shifter 𝑝𝑡−𝑚 with time invariant measures of 
local historic preservation policies, denoted  List𝒊 and CA𝒊 and collected by Historic England 
between 2008 and 2012. Spatial differences in these measures provide the main source of 
variation from which we obtain results. For ease of interpretation, we standardise the planning 
variables by centring on the mean and dividing by the standard deviation throughout. Our goal 
is to estimate the effect of historic preservation policies on energy price elasticities rather than 
the elasticities themselves. Therefore, we henceforth include year fixed effects γt (which 
subsume national heating degree days as well as national energy prices) to control for 
previously unaccounted factors at national level, e.g. macroeconomic conditions or national 
policy changes to subsidise energy efficiency: 
  e𝑖𝑗𝑟𝑡 = β2p𝑡−𝑚 × List𝑖 + β3p𝑡−𝑚 × CA𝑖 + α1w𝑗𝑡 + γ𝑡 + γ𝑖 + ∑ δ𝑟D𝑟
9
𝑟=1 t + ε𝑖𝑗𝑟𝑡 . (2) 
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This specification tests whether the prevalence of preservation policies conditions local energy 
demand responses to price changes. The coefficient β1 estimated in equation (1) can be 
interpreted as the elasticity of domestic energy consumption with respect to real unit energy 
prices. As we standardise the preservation policy measures, the coefficients β2 and β3 represent 
the extent to which a one standard deviation increase in the share of residential Listed Buildings 
and the share of dwellings within Conservation Areas, respectively, modify this price elasticity. 
Our expectation is that, all else equal, preservation policies will make domestic energy 
consumption less elastic to exogenous national energy price changes (β2, β3 > 0).   
Although we account for national factors through year fixed effects and regional trends, the 
interaction terms in these regressions could be picking up local trends in energy consumption 
that are correlated with our time invariant measures of historic preservation. This could operate 
through a variety of channels. Koster et al. (2016) find that richer households in the Netherlands 
have strong preferences for historical amenities and sort into historic neighbourhoods. Rich 
individuals are likely to have a relatively price inelastic demand for energy and may also be 
more likely to own their homes. Hence, they may have greater incentives to make long-term 
investments in improving home energy efficiency, as found empirically by Davis (2011). Aside 
from the characteristics of households, Kahn and Walsh (2015) identify climatic factors and 
housing stock characteristics as drivers of domestic energy consumption, while Glaeser and 
Kahn (2010) show that patterns of energy consumption can vary with urban form. 
To address these issues we progressively add controls, fixed effects and trends to the 
specification in equation (2). We first include variables in which linear time trends are 
interacted with time-invariant demographic and socio-economic characteristics. These 
comprise neighbourhood median household income in 2004 as well as variables drawn from 
the 2001 Census: share of residents with further education degree; share lone parents; share 
owner-occupiers; share ethnicity white; share age 45-59, share age 60+; share managers, 
professionals, or associate professionals; and share employed. These controls allow us to 
identify the impacts of historic preservation policies off of trends in energy consumption in 
places that are similar in terms of demographic and socio-economic characteristics, and should 
capture the heterogeneity in household energy demand elasticities documented by Reiss and 
White (2005).10 
It is also possible that localised factors, such as temperature, could be driving energy 
consumption patterns, so we next include a full set of commuting zone (known in the UK as 
Travel to Work Areas) by year fixed effects. This allows us to partial out unobserved patterns 
in energy consumption common to labour market areas—for example those that might be driven 
by localised changes in climate—and, with around 140 commuting zones in England, imply 
that we are making comparisons across neighbourhoods in close proximity to one another (e.g. 
within London). 
The characteristics of the local housing stock are also likely to determine energy consumption 
and the scope for making energy efficiency improvements. To help us disentangle the effect of 
                                                 
10 We cannot test whether our findings are different for owner-occupied versus rental dwellings because our data 
are measured at the neighbourhood-level and not the home-level. However, we control for linear trends interacted 
with the neighbourhood-wide share of owner-occupied homes. 
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historic preservation from effects associated with the vintage of properties, we introduce two 
further sets of trend variables, interacting linear trends with a vector of share variables for 
neighbourhood building types (share flat, share terrace, share semi-detached, with the omitted 
category being share detached), and a vector of neighbourhood building vintage variables (share 
built pre-1900 and between: 1900-1918; 1919-1929; 1930-1939; 1945-1964; 1965-1982; 1983-
1999; with the omitted category being share built after 2000; 1940-1946 is missing as 
essentially no new homes were built during the Second World War and statistics are not 
available). The former set of trends reflects that different house types could imply different 
home energy needs or efficiency requirements. For example, detached houses usually have 
more external wall area than other dwelling types. The latter set reflects well-documented 
relationships in the literature: between building vintage and energy consumption (Costa and 
Kahn, 2010; Brounen et al., 2012; Kahn et al., 2014), and between building codes and energy 
consumption (Jacobsen and Kotchen, 2013, Aroonruengsawat et al., 2012). These building 
vintage controls are likely important in our setting where the housing stock comprises dwellings 
built using a range of building technologies and under various energy efficiency standards.11 In 
turn, localised variation in these features could be relevant in determining home energy 
consumption and the scope for improvements in home energy efficiency.   
Two further sets of controls account for patterns in domestic energy consumption that may be 
associated with urban structure and form. Urban economic theory suggests that urban density 
may be highest in the centre of cities, and—to the extent that denser places are more tightly 
regulated—it is possible our estimates may capture correlates of urban density rather than the 
effect of historic preservation. To address this, and to control for other possible confounding 
factors, we introduce the interaction between the distance between the neighbourhood centroid 
and the population weighted centre of the commuting zone (S𝑖) with our energy price demand 
shifter.  
Our final control strategy reflects that households in rural and urban areas tend to rely on a 
different mix of fuels for heating homes. Over two million dwellings in England, or 10% of the 
total, are not connected to the gas transmission network (DECC, 2014). The vast majority of 
these dwellings are in rural areas, and are heated by alternative fuels, including electric heating 
and Liquefied Petroleum Gas. Thus, households living in such dwellings are more likely than 
those residing in urban areas to consume a different mix of fuels and be exposed to a different 
set of fuel prices, neither of which we observe. Off-gas-grid homes are also considered to be 
“hard-to-treat” in terms of improving home energy efficiency (Beaumont, 2007). Thus, we drop 
most rural neighbourhoods, that is, we drop neighbourhoods that have zero mains gas 
                                                 
11 In general, the older the dwelling, the less likely it is that it was built with energy efficiency measures already 
installed. For example, dwellings built prior to the introduction of national Building Regulations in 1965 were 
rarely insulated, and there was no requirement to insulate dwellings until the 1980s. Dwellings built after the 1920s 
were generally built with cavity walls whereas those built previously had solid walls and as such cannot benefit 
from cavity wall insulation technologies. Thus, while older dwellings may have greater scope for energy efficiency 
improvements, such homes are typically “hard-to-treat” with energy efficiency upgrades (Beaumont, 2007; 
Dowson et al., 2012). Our vintage data only go back to 1900. However, this is not a material concern because 96% 
of dwellings built pre-1850 and 92% of those built between 1850 and 1899 are “hard to treat”, compared to 47% 
of dwellings built between 1919 and 1944 (Building Research Establishment, 2008).   
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consumption and those places recorded as being in a “sparse” or “village” setting in the 2011 
Census, and allow for a linear trend in each of the remaining rural-urban categories. 
Taking account of these strategies, our final specification is: 
 e𝑖𝑗𝑟𝑡 = β2p𝑡−𝑚 × List𝑖 + β3p𝑡−𝑚 × CA𝑖 +  λ1p𝑡−𝑚 × S𝑖 + α1w𝑗𝑡 + γ𝑖 + 𝑔(𝑡) + ε𝑖𝑗𝑟𝑡. (3) 
where our time effects g(t) are captured by commuting zone -by-year fixed effects and linear 
time trends interacted with a host of geographical, housing market, and socio-economic 
variables (region indicators, Census 2001 variables, household income in 2004, building type 
and vintage share variables, and rural-urban indicators).  
After presenting results based on the specification described above, we report additional 
regressions in which we: (i) use an alternative estimation approach—stacked regression—that 
exploits the richness of our data; (ii) explore the robustness of our main approach to changing 
the panel frequency or the lag or lead price structure (i.e., varying m); (iii) explore the robustness 
of our findings to using alternative control trends, preservation policy measures, sample 
restrictions, demand shifters, and dependent variables; (iv) use Green Belts as a placebo test; 
and (v) adopt an approach—pairwise fixed effect regression—in which we control flexibly for 
neighbourhood-level characteristics.12  
The first set of these additional regressions exploits the depth of our data by treating each fuel 
type (indexed by f) separately, but stacking the observations so that each neighbourhood-year 
cell has two rows in the data. This permits us to adopt the following specification:  
 e𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑟𝑡 = β2p𝑓(𝑡−𝑚) × List𝑖 + β3p𝑓(𝑡−𝑚) × CA𝑖 + 𝛿1p𝑓(𝑡−𝑚) × S𝑖 +  α1w𝑗𝑡 (4) 
+γ𝑓𝑖 + 𝑔(𝑓, 𝑡) + ε𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑟𝑡. 
We regress the natural log of domestic energy consumption per capita for fuel type f on the 
policy variables interacted with the one-year lag (m=1) of the log national real price for fuel 
type f and a number of controls. These include local wages, fuel-specific neighbourhood fixed 
effects (γ𝑓𝑖) as well as a set of fuel and year specific effects g(f,t): year-by-fuel type fixed 
effects, neighbourhood-year fixed effects, as well as the full set of trends from equation (3) 
interacted with fuel type f. One key benefit of this approach is that it allows us to control for 
neighbourhood-year fixed effects, which partial out any factors that have a common effect on 
per capita gas and electricity consumption in each neighbourhood-year cell. As such, this 
approach—in which we rely on divergences in electricity and gas prices for identification—
provides a powerful cross-check on our main specification. 
Robustness checks (ii)-(iv) return to our main specification (equation (3)). All checks use 
domestic energy consumption and price variables that combine the two fuel types (gas and 
electricity). We conduct our placebo test with Green Belts (iv) using both the main specification 
and the stacked regression approach (equation (4)). 
Our final robustness check (v) is designed to control flexibly for neighbourhood-level factors 
(such as income) or dynamic processes (such as gentrification) that could correlate with the 
extent of historic preservation and simultaneously determine the responsiveness of energy 
consumption to energy prices. To control for these factors less parametrically than in our 
                                                 
12 We also provide further checks on outliers, and non-linearities, respectively, in Web Appendix Tables 2 and 3. 
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baseline regression, we use a pairwise fixed effect approach, repeating the specification in 
equation (3) but adding a neighbourhood pair-by-year fixed effect where pairs constitute 
adjacent observations when ranking neighbourhoods on various observable characteristics, e.g. 
average house prices, income, and various measures of gentrification.  
3.3. Energy Price Elasticities 
Before exploring the effects of historic preservation policies on domestic energy-related 
outcomes, Table 3 reports estimates of the elasticity of domestic energy consumption with 
respect to energy prices. We do not seek to make a causal interpretation of these estimates. 
Rather, our intention is to provide benchmark elasticities against which we can interpret the 
effects of historic preservation policies estimated in subsequent tables. 
Table 3 documents several specifications that regress log per capita energy consumption on our 
weighted energy price measures and the control variables in equation (1). In this and all 
subsequent tables, except where indicated, standard errors are clustered at planning authority 
level. The first three columns of Table 3 report estimates of the elasticity of domestic energy 
consumption with respect to different energy price lag structures. Column 1 uses 
contemporaneous prices, Column 2 uses a one-year lag, Column 3 a two-year lag, and Column 
4 all these prices together. Although estimated elasticities are significant in all of the first three 
columns, the coefficients suggest that energy consumption responds most strongly to one-year 
lagged prices. The final column confirms this and suggests that the coefficient on the one-year 
lag (-0.479) in Column 2 is a good approximation for the aggregate effect across all three price 
measures in Column 4, which together sum to -0.456. Based on these results, we adopt the 
coefficient from Column 2 as a benchmark elasticity against which we interpret subsequent 
results. The elasticity implies that for every 10% increase in the price of energy, per capita 
domestic energy consumption falls by 4.8%. While energy consumption in England appears to 
be relatively price elastic, our estimate is broadly comparable with previous estimates of short-
term energy price elasticities.13     
3.4 Baseline Specifications – Domestic Energy Consumption 
Our analysis now turns to the extent to which historic preservation policies condition energy 
price elasticities. We introduce preservation policies by including interaction terms between the 
one-year lagged weighted energy price demand shifter and our measures of preservation 
policies. Each column of Table 4 refers to the same specification but using different interaction 
terms: the regressions in Panel A always include the Listed Building interaction; Panel B the 
Conservation Area interaction; and, Panel C both preservation policy interactions. Moving from 
the left- to the right-hand side of the table we progressively add controls to deal with the 
endogeneity issues discussed in Section 3.2. 
Column 1 constitutes the analogue of equation (2), and includes neighbourhood and year fixed 
effects, regional trends, and planning authority-level wages as controls. Looking at Panels A to 
C of Column 1, it is evident that the interactions on Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas 
                                                 
13 Ito (2014) finds an average price elasticity of electricity consumption of -0.12 while Reiss and White (2005) 
estimate an elasticity of -0.39. Our estimates are not directly comparable as we evaluate the elasticity of energy 
(gas + electricity) consumption with respect to weighted energy prices. However, we obtain similar magnitudes 
when focusing on each fuel type separately.    
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are significant when each is included in turn but when both are included jointly, only the Listed 
Building coefficient remains significant. We illustrate the broad magnitude of effects this 
specification implies by comparing the coefficients on the interaction terms to the elasticity 
given in Column 2 of Table 3. For example, the coefficient in Column 1 of Panel A of Table 4 
(0.0633) implies that a one standard deviation increase in the share of Listed Buildings reduces 
the energy price elasticity by 0.0633/0.479 = 13.2%.  
The remaining columns of Table 4 add further controls, building up to the model corresponding 
to equation (3). Columns 2 and 3 address the concern of correlated trends. In the first of these 
columns, we include linear time trends interacted with demographic and socio-economic 
characteristics drawn from the 2001 Census and median net household income in 2004. In 
Column 3, we replace the year fixed effects by a set of commuting zone interacted with year 
fixed effects. Across these two columns, the estimated effects for each of the preservation 
policies when considered individually are fairly stable. However, when compared to Column 1 
the specifications in Panel C suggest that the addition of control variables and trends allows us 
to better disentangle the effects of the two policies such that each is separately significant 
conditional on the other policy.  
Given the scope for energy efficiency upgrades in older houses independent of the impact of 
historic preservation, in Column 4, we control for the housing characteristics (including age). 
However, the findings are essentially unchanged.14 In Column 5, we condition out urban form 
issues by including the interaction between the distance from the neighbourhood- to the 
commuting zone -centre and the one-year lagged energy price as an additional control. The 
historic preservation policy coefficients are remarkably stable.  
The final Column 6 of Table 4 includes the full set of controls but also drops rural 
neighbourhoods and additionally allows for idiosyncratic linear trends for each of the other 
rural-urban indicator classifications. Our preferred specification is Panel C.15 This includes both 
preservation policies. The coefficients are generally slightly weaker than those reported in the 
corresponding specification in Column 5 yet remain highly significant.  
We estimate the broad magnitude of the impacts of the two preservation policies on the 
elasticity of domestic energy consumption with respect to energy prices, again using the 
estimate in Column 2 of Table 3 as our benchmark elasticity. The comparison suggests that all 
else equal, a one standard deviation increase from the mean value in the number of Grade II 
Listed Buildings per 100 dwellings implies a reduction in the elasticity of 0.0199/0.479 = 4.2%. 
A one standard deviation increase from its mean value in the share of dwellings in Conservation 
Areas implies a reduction in the elasticity of 0.0164/0.479 = 3.4%. These comparisons represent 
conservative estimates of the effects of preservation policies because the benchmark price 
elasticity in the denominator is more elastic than estimates in the literature.     
Despite the size of the coefficients and their implied quantitative magnitudes, these estimates 
do not imply that Conservation Areas have effects that are similar in magnitude to the more 
                                                 
14 As the age profile of homes may be the result of historic preservation policies, the vintage controls could be 
interpreted as being bad controls. Yet, the lack of material differences in coefficients when we include these 
variables should allay concerns.  
15 We provide the full results for this specification in Web Appendix Table 4. 
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restrictive Listed Buildings, which would be counter-intuitive. This is because the standard 
deviation of the number of Listed Buildings per 100 dwellings (2.7) is only around a fifth of 
the standard deviation of the share of all dwellings that are in Conservation Areas (15.7%). In 
fact, when we do not scale the data, our findings suggest that Listed Buildings reduce the price 
elasticity by a factor of around seven compared to dwellings in Conservation Areas. This is 
consistent with our observation in Section 2 that, all else equal, a Listed Building is regulated 
by a considerably more restrictive regime than a dwelling in a Conservation Area. 
3.5. Robustness Checks 
We first report findings from stacked regressions (equation (4)) in Table 5. Reassuringly, results 
indicate that the policy interactions remain statistically significant when the policy variables 
are entered individually, or when entered jointly as in Column 3. The relative size of the 
coefficients is broadly similar to those in Column 6 of Table 4. However, there are some 
differences since in absolute terms the coefficients for the stacked regression reported in 
Column 3 are more than 30% larger than the results in our preferred (most rigorous) 
specification, suggesting that the latter estimates are likely to be conservative.16    
Our second set of robustness checks—reported in Table 6—considers the lag structure of 
energy prices and other timing issues. In the first four columns, we report historic preservation 
effects using lag energy price assumptions other than the one-year lag used in our baseline 
specification: Column 1 uses contemporaneous energy prices; Column 2 the second lag; 
Column 3 uses both the current price as well as the first lag; and, Column 4 uses the first and 
the second lag. Results suggest that the first lag of prices dominates and that using this lag 
structure should be sufficient to capture overall effects.17 Under perfect information, rational 
households may respond to future expected energy prices rather than past prices. In Column 5, 
we test this by including the first lag and the first lead. We again find that the first lag dominates 
and the lead is not statistically significant. In Column 6, we compute a rolling weighted average 
of the current energy price and future energy prices over the subsequent nine years, where 
energy prices are actual prices (up to 2015), or else 2015 DECC forecasts (for 2016 and later); 
weights are based on discount factors using an annual discount rate of 3.5%.18 We again find 
that the first lag dominates and the future price is not statistically significant. A related issue is 
that until now, our estimates for domestic energy consumption have been generated from year-
on-year variations at the neighbourhood-level that deviate from the trends implied by the initial 
characteristics of the Census. One concern is that these changes are unlikely to be sufficient to 
induce households to adopt new technologies. To explore this possibility, Column 7 evaluates 
the long-term adjustment to energy price changes by including only the first and last year (i.e. 
                                                 
16 One potential concern with the stacked regressions is that they are unweighted so that the estimation of the 
coefficients places equal weight on gas and electricity consumption. We obtain near identical results when 
weighting the regressions with the consumption share of each fuel type in each neighbourhood in 2005. 
17 This is because, for each of the two preservation policies, the sum of coefficients from the two lags is very close 
in magnitude to the first lag alone. Our counterfactual results in Section 4 are extremely similar when we use the 
first lag alone or both lags together. For ease of interpretation, we proceed using the first lag alone.  
18 Weights given to energy prices in current and future years 𝜏 ϵ (t, t+9) are 𝑤𝜏 =
𝑑𝑓𝜏
∑ 𝑑𝑓𝜏
𝜏=𝑡+9
𝜏=𝑡
 where 𝑑𝑓𝜏 is the discount 
factor from using an annual discount rate of 3.5% i.e. 𝑑𝑓𝜏 = 1.035
−(𝜏−𝑡).  Thus the discount factor for the current 
energy price is 1 and the discount factor for the energy price nine years ahead is 0.73. 
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2006 and 2013) of our panel and dropping the years in between. Results are largely consistent 
with our main results, albeit—as expected—somewhat larger.  
We conduct a number of additional checks in Appendix B; the additional variables used in these 
are shown in Appendix Table 1 and the results are reported in Appendix Tables 2-4. In 
Appendix Table 2, we demonstrate that our findings are robust to using alternative (i) control 
trends including interacting energy prices (rather than linear trends) with average household net 
income at neighbourhood-level, Census characteristics, and dwelling types and ages, (ii) 
historic preservation policy measures, (iii) sample restrictions (dropping the only year in our 
sample with falling prices,19 retaining outliers, and dropping London neighbourhoods), (iv) 
demand shifters, and (v) dependent variables. In Appendix Table 3, we re-run the models 
specified in equations (3) and (4) with a non-historic preservation policy measure—share of 
planning authority dwellings in Green Belts—that acts as a placebo. As expected, we find no 
significant results. In Appendix Table 4, we return to equation (3) but use pairwise fixed effects 
to control flexibly for potential confounders such as income or house price growth. Again, we 
find no material differences to our baseline results when using a strategy that relies on 
comparing places that are near-identical on these factors.20  
3.6 Mechanism: Home Energy Efficiency 
Our results so far imply that preservation policies reduce the energy price elasticity. In this sub-
section, we evaluate whether the evidence supports our proposition that the effects of 
preservation policies are driven by a home energy efficiency channel, that is, some energy 
efficiency upgrades in designated dwellings may be either more expensive or fail to conform 
to regulations and hence, are technically illegal. 
In Table 7, we report similar regressions to those in Table 4 but at the planning authority level, 
replacing the dependent variable with counts of all home energy efficiency installations in the 
HEED data. These include wall insulation, loft insulation, double glazing, new boilers, new 
heating systems, micro-generation and energy efficient lighting. Due to data availability, our 
set of controls is necessarily slightly different to the specifications reported in Table 4: planning 
authority fixed effects, time-varying counts of households, planning authority-level wages, and 
additional demographic controls that are only available at the planning authority-level (share 
with further education degree or equivalent, share aged 16-44, and share aged 45+), as well as 
linear trends interacted with building type and the full set of vintage share variables. If 
individuals living in designated dwellings are less able to respond to higher energy prices by 
investing in home energy efficiency, we should expect the coefficients on the interaction 
between energy prices and the policy variables to be negative. 
This is borne out in the data. Column 1 of Table 7 suggests that a one standard deviation increase 
in the share of Listed Buildings and Conservation Area dwellings, respectively, reduces the 
amount of home energy investments by 8,680 and 4,350 installations. Separating out specific 
installations illustrates that, in line with our priors, Conservation Area restrictions tend to bite 
                                                 
19 The issue here, as highlighted in the introduction, is that we would not expect falling prices to incentivise 
investments in energy efficiency improvements regardless of the prevalence of historic preservation policies.  
20 In the Web Appendix we show that results are robust to dropping neighbourhoods with the highest and lowest 
intensity of preservation (Web Appendix Table 2), and that preservation policy effects can be found in 
neighbourhoods with varying degrees (quartiles) of preservation (Web Appendix Table 3). 
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on external changes while those on Listed Buildings are more pervasive. Column 2 documents 
that both policies reduce wall insulations (which will sometimes be external) but in Column 3 
the effect of Conservation Areas on loft installations (which are internal) is insignificant. 
Columns 4 to 6 show results only for 2006 to 2007 due to the data being restricted to this period. 
The findings are again consistent with our priors: the coefficients for both policies are larger in 
absolute terms for double glazing (external), albeit marginally insignificant for Conservation 
Areas, while effects on new heating systems and boilers (internal) are meaningful and 
significant for Listed Buildings but not for Conservation Areas.21    
In Table 8 we evaluate the impact of home energy efficiency investments on domestic energy 
consumption using dwelling-scale energy consumption and installations data drawn from the 
NEED. Controlling for dwelling fixed effects and time-varying area level characteristics, we 
find that the installation of new boilers, loft insulation, and wall insulation are associated with 
reductions in energy consumption of 7%, 2.5%, and 8%, respectively.22 These results are 
consistent with a technology adoption channel driving the relationship between historic 
preservation policies and domestic energy consumption found in Table 4. 
4. Counterfactual Analysis 
To understand the implications of our findings, we use our models to simulate energy 
consumption during the sample period under a range of alternative counterfactual scenarios. In 
all cases, the preferred model—Column 6 of Panel C in Table 4—is used to make in-sample 
predictions. Because this specification drops rural neighbourhoods, we capture effects in urban 
areas only. Hence, we are likely to underestimate England’s total energy consumption.  
We first use the model to predict the total cumulative energy consumption between 2006 and 
2013, not considering any counterfactual changes. We do this by taking the fitted model values 
for log per capita domestic energy consumption for each neighbourhood, converting this into 
total domestic energy consumption and then summing up over the sample of neighbourhoods 
and years. As documented in Table 9, this gives a cumulative 2006 to 2013 total energy 
consumption of 2.4 million gigawatt hours (GWh). The remaining rows of Table 9 compare 
this baseline prediction with modelled predictions when we vary the share of all dwellings that 
are affected by historic preservation policies. This allows us to assess the total impact of the 
policies on domestic energy consumption and carbon dioxide emissions.  
The first set of scenarios in Panel A of Table 9—Rows 1 to 3—evaluates the domestic energy 
savings that were not realised during our sample period due to preservation policies, by setting 
                                                 
21 These findings should be interpreted with some caution, both because of the more aggregated nature of the 
analysis and the lower quality of the underlying data compared to our first panel. Consistent with these 
reservations, when we normalise the dependent variables in these regressions by home counts or specify the 
dependent variable as log ratios (adapting the formulation used by Gillingham and Bollinger, 2017) the policies 
are individually significant when estimated in isolation but are not both statistically significant when they are 
estimated together: see Web Appendix Table 5.     
22 To provide further support for our proposed mechanism, we conduct an planning authority-level IV regression 
with domestic energy consumption per person as the dependent variable, the total number of installations in an 
planning authority as endogenous explanatory variable and the preservation policies interacted with the energy 
price demand shifter as instruments. These IV estimates support our mechanism in that they suggest that 
preservation policies affect energy consumption through an energy efficiency investment mechanism: see Web 
Appendix Table 6.  
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each policy to zero in turn and comparing the outcome to our baseline prediction. We find that 
cumulative 2006 to 2013 energy consumption (of all dwellings in our sample) declines by 1.7% 
if Conservation Areas are set to zero (Row 1); 1.2% if Listed Buildings are set to zero (Row 2); 
and, 2.9% if both policies are set to zero (Row 3). In Figure 1, we showed that areas with more 
preservation are associated with less – not more – domestic energy consumption in the cross-
section. The results in Panel A of Table 9 convey instead that, after controlling for confounders, 
energy consumption in these areas would be substantially lower in the absence of preservation. 
In the remaining columns of Table 9, we calculate the financial and carbon costs under DECC 
assumptions that: natural gas represents 73% of the domestic energy consumed; each kWh of 
electricity and natural gas consumed produces 0.185 kg and 0.523 kg of CO2, respectively; and, 
the unit costs of electricity and natural gas are 15.8p per kWh and 5.1p per kWh, respectively. 
Based on these assumptions, the two policies collectively cost residents roughly £5.6 ($9.2) 
billion over the period 2006-13 and led to an additional 19.2 million tonnes of CO2 being 
emitted. In the final column, we demonstrate that, at almost 3%, the saving is a relatively small 
proportion of total energy consumption. However, only around 10% of England’s dwellings are 
affected by preservation policies. This implies that absent preservation policy restrictions, 
energy consumption in these particular dwellings would have been reduced by more than a 
quarter.  
Panels B to D of Table 9 describe three further counterfactual scenarios. In Panel B, the 
preservation policies are reverted back to 1980 levels, a scenario that we deem plausible in that 
most dwellings with high heritage value were already designated at that point in time.23 During 
the 1980s, there was a major spike in the number of Listed Buildings (see Figure 5) due to a 
review of the Statutory List following public outcry at the demolition of London's (unlisted) 
Art Deco Firestone tyre factory, in 1980. Our counterfactual reflects what may have occurred 
had the list review not taken place and had the numbers of designated dwellings remained at 
1980 levels ever since. Reducing both policies back to 1980 levels has the effect of reducing 
Conservation Areas by around a third and the number of Listed Buildings by around half. Under 
these assumptions 2006-2013 energy consumption is reduced by 1.3% or around 31,000 GWh. 
This implies a cumulative saving to households of roughly £2.5 ($4.1) billion and 8.5 million 
tonnes less carbon. In Panels C and D, we explore the effects of reducing or increasing, 
respectively, preservation policies by one standard deviation.  
5. Welfare considerations 
In this section, we discuss the welfare implications of our empirical findings. There are at least 
five types of benefits related to heritage and designation. First, an internal heritage effect, 𝑏𝐼𝐻, 
i.e., a value attached to historic dwellings irrespective of designation. Second, external localised 
heritage effects, 𝑏𝐸𝐻, i.e., a value attached to dwellings nearby with views of historic dwellings. 
Third, wider external benefits, e.g., the existence value of historic dwellings (Wright and 
Eppink, 2016), 𝑏𝐸𝑉, which again may apply irrespective of designation. Fourth, a value for 
designated historic dwellings, 𝑏𝐷𝐻. If designation does not generate additional benefits, then 
𝑏𝐷𝐻 = 𝑏𝐼𝐻. Or put differently, 𝑏𝐼𝐷𝑃 = 𝑏𝐷𝐻 − 𝑏𝐼𝐻 is the internal premium in value attached to 
                                                 
23 Ahlfeldt et al. (2012) find that property price premiums for Conservation Area dwellings increase with the time 
since designation and that those designated before 1981 trade at a slight premium to those designated thereafter.  
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designation. Fifth, a value attached to dwellings with views on designated dwellings, 𝑏𝑉𝐷. If 
designation has an inherent value for nearby owners, then 𝑏𝑉𝐷 > 𝑏𝐸𝐻, or we can denote the 
external heritage designation premium as 𝑏𝐸𝐷𝑃 = 𝑏𝑉𝐷 − 𝑏𝐸𝐻.  
Maintaining heritage value and complying with preservation restrictions also incurs costs, 
which may be neglected by policy makers. First, there are two types of internal costs associated 
with heritage. Some, 𝑐𝐼𝐸, are associated with higher energy consumption, whereas others, 𝑐𝐼𝑂, 
are not (e.g., higher maintenance costs and increased costs associated with ‘outdated’ layouts). 
Similarly, designated heritage dwellings have internal costs, 𝑐𝐷𝐸 and 𝑐𝐷𝑂, where 𝑐𝐷𝑂 includes 
the increased costs associated with, e.g., obtaining planning permission. The internal cost of 
designation associated with energy, 𝑐𝐼𝐷𝐸, is thus 𝑐𝐷𝐸 − 𝑐𝐼𝐸, which arises because designation 
increases the cost of energy efficiency improvements or prevents them altogether. The other 
internal policy costs associated with designation, 𝑐𝐼𝐷𝑂, are equal to 𝑐𝐷𝑂 − 𝑐𝐼𝑂. Second, there is 
an external policy cost, c𝐸𝐷, in the form of negative externalities such as increased GHG 
emissions. Third, there may be a designation-induced cost in the form of a general equilibrium 
effect, 𝑐𝐺𝐸, due to preservation policies creating aggregate constraints on housing supply at 
city- or country-level (Glaeser, 2011; Hilber and Vermeulen, 2016). While we cannot estimate 
the potential costs of such constraints, these are likely to push up house prices thus reducing 
housing consumption in England.  
Recent research has focused mainly on the benefits of historic preservation, with empirical work 
largely based on house price data. Koster et al. (2016) estimate the premium for houses with 
views of designated buildings, i.e., 𝑏𝑉𝐷, at around 3.5%. Additional results suggest that 
designated buildings do not trade at a premium, i.e., 𝑏𝐷𝐻 − 𝑐𝐷𝐸 − 𝑐𝐷𝑂 =0. Ahlfeldt et al. (2012) 
estimate that houses just inside and outside Conservation Areas in England trade at a positive 
premium of 8.5%  (= 𝑏𝐷𝐻 + 𝑏𝑉𝐷 − 𝑐𝐷𝐸 − 𝑐𝐷𝑂) and 5% (=𝑏𝑉𝐷), respectively.
24 They also find a 
weak positive effect of designation on property prices just outside Conservation Areas (i.e., 
𝑏𝐸𝐷𝑃 = 𝑏𝑉𝐷 − 𝑏𝐸𝐻 > 0). For New York, Been et al. (2016) find that historic designation boosts 
the value of properties immediately outside the designated district, by nearly 12%, which is 
substantially larger than the estimate of 𝑏𝐸𝐷𝑃 in Ahlfeldt et al. (2012). However, these same 
properties sell at a discount (of roughly 5%) prior to designation, suggesting unobserved 
differences in structural features of properties in the vicinity of newly designated historic 
districts or lower levels of investment in those properties.25  
On the cost side, Been et al. (2016) document that where the value of the option to build 
unrestricted is higher, designation has a less positive effect on property values within the 
district. This suggests larger, other internal costs, 𝑐𝐷𝑂. Similarly, Ahlfeldt et al. (2012) find a 
zero effect of designation on house prices inside Conservation Areas (i.e., 𝑏𝐸𝐷𝑃 + 𝑏𝐼𝐷𝑃 −
𝑐𝐼𝐷𝐸 − 𝑐𝐼𝐷𝑂 = 0), leading them to conclude that the private benefits (arising from historic 
preservation) and costs associated with designation (e.g., in the form of higher maintenance 
costs or lower energy efficiency) may perfectly offset each other. This is suggestive of localised 
Pareto efficiency. However, similar to Koster et al. (2016) they neither separately estimate the 
                                                 
24 Also see Holman and Ahlfeldt (2015), Ahlfeldt et al. (2012), and Ahlfeldt and Holman (2018). 
25 Koster and Rouwendal (2017) use temporal variation in investments in cultural heritage in the Netherlands to 
identify the impact of such investments on prices of houses not covered by designation. 
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internal policy costs of designation associated with energy consumption, 𝑐𝐼𝐷𝐸, nor attempt to 
quantify the external policy cost,  𝑐𝐸𝐷, both of which are the focus of our analysis. 
We infer from our first counterfactual scenario (Panel A of Table 9) that 𝑐𝐼𝐷𝐸 approximates 
£5.6 ($9.2) billion in additional energy bills over the period from 2006 to 2013, around £0.7 
($1.1) billion annually, or, in perpetuity26, £23.2 ($38.3) billion assuming a discount rate27 of 
3%.This is equivalent to a £348 ($574) increase in annual energy bills for each of the two 
million dwellings covered by historic preservation policies in England. Expressed as a 
proportion of house prices and to the extent that higher energy bills are fully capitalised into 
lower house prices, an average house price in Conservation Areas of around £240,000 
($396,000) implies a price effect of -4.8% (roughly £11,600 ($19,100)). Reassuringly, this 
implied private cost is quite close to the hedonic value of energy efficiency certification (‘green 
labels’) in the literature of 5% in California (Kahn and Kok, 2014) and 3.5% in the Netherlands 
(Brounen and Kok, 2011).28  
To quantify the external policy cost associated with designation, 𝑐𝐸𝐷, we use an estimated 
marginal abatement cost of GHG emissions of £60 ($99) (following DECC (2015), the non-
traded, ‘central range’ price for 2013 is £61 ($100) in 2015 prices. We deflate this to 2013 
prices using the GDP deflator). This implies a social carbon cost of historic preservation 
policies of around £1.2 ($1.9) billion over the period 2006-2013, around £144 ($238) million 
annually (or in perpetuity, £4.8 ($7.9) billion). These totals are, respectively, equivalent to an 
annual social cost of £72 ($119) (or in perpetuity £2,406 ($3,970)) per designated dwelling. 
Although these costs will not be capitalised into house prices, we note that they equate to 
roughly 1% of the average value of a house in Conservation Areas. If we only consider a 
relaxation of historic preservation policies to 1980-levels, rather than the unrealistic scenario 
of abolishing these policies entirely, the carbon cost savings between 2006 and 2013 amount to 
£520 ($858) million—or around £2.2 ($3.6) billion in present value terms.  
If we take the finding in Ahlfeldt et al. (2017) at face value that designation has a zero net 
internal effect (i.e., within designated areas) on house prices at the margin, then  𝑏𝐸𝐷𝑃 + 𝑏𝐼𝐷𝑃 =
𝑐𝐼𝐷𝐸 + 𝑐𝐼𝐷𝑂. This is consistent with political economy frameworks that model historic 
preservation as the outcome of localised decision-making. There are, however, at least two 
types of external benefits that are likely ignored by local residents: an existence value, 𝑏𝐸𝑉, and 
an external designation premium, 𝑏𝐸𝐷𝑃, safeguarded by historic preservation. The recent 
economic literature has mainly focused on these benefits. The literature also recognises external 
                                                 
26 This is a simplifying assumption. It highlights the fact that the foregone energy efficiency savings do not stop 
in 2013 but will continue into the future. It ignores, however, the fact that the estimated differences in energy costs 
are context specific, that is, they depend on an evolving stock of energy efficiency installations, a particular history 
of energy price dynamics, the lifespan of energy efficiency technologies and the future rate of innovation in such 
technologies (see Section 2.3). Whether the cost actually realised ex post (i.e., in perpetuity) of preservation 
policies is larger or smaller than our estimated present value is not per se clear. 
27 We apply a discount rate of 3% throughout. The HMT Green Book suggests a discount rate of 3.5% for the first 
30 years and declining discount rates thereafter. Our discount rate in perpetuity of 3% is a simplified approximation 
of this schedule but with the advantage of making our calculations accessible and is consistent with empirical 
estimates of housing market discount rates in the UK in Bracke et al. (2018) and Koster and Pinchbeck (2018). In 
estimating the social cost of carbon, we also assume a constant carbon price over time. 
28 The hedonic value of energy efficiency certificates can be interpreted as the present value of energy savings 
resulting from up-to-date home energy efficiency installations (compared to ‘standard’ or outdated ones). 
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costs associated with general equilibrium effects, 𝑐𝐺𝐸, due to regulatory supply constraints 
(including those imposed by historic preservation policies) creating aggregate constraints on 
housing supply. In this paper we identify and emphasize for the first time yet another sizeable 
external cost: the external policy (or carbon) cost 𝑐𝐸𝐷. These external costs are also likely 
ignored by local residents in determining the extent of historic preservation.  
6. Conclusions  
Historic preservation policies are widespread across Europe and parts of North America. The 
external benefits of these policies are well documented. At the same time, governments around 
the world have set ambitious energy saving and GHG emissions reduction targets. In this 
context, the UK government’s Home Energy Efficiency Policy Framework (Committee on 
Climate Change, 2014) recognizes that “…beyond 2017 low-cost potential [loft, cavity wall] is 
increasingly exhausted”. This has led to a shift in focus towards different energy-saving 
technologies and a focus on 9.2 million “hard-to-treat” homes, which includes many dwellings 
in Conservation Areas as well as Listed Buildings.  
In this paper we uncover a trade-off between improvements in energy efficiency and preserving 
built heritage. We present evidence that restrictions on alterations to dwellings that are either 
lying in Conservation Areas or are designated as Listed Buildings substantially increased 
domestic energy consumption in England between 2006 and 2013. We find that rising energy 
prices induce an increase in home energy efficiency installations and a corresponding decrease 
in energy consumption. However, such energy savings are significantly less pronounced in 
Conservation Areas and Listed Buildings. Our findings imply that policies that aim to induce 
energy savings and reduce GHG emissions, ought to account for the unintended consequences 
of regulations induced by historic preservation policies. Potential exemptions from the 
restrictions governing Conservation Areas and Listed Buildings could be made for energy 
efficiency upgrades. Such exemptions may work well for internal improvements in Listed 
Buildings; exemptions for external alterations must balance reductions in external costs against 
reductions in external benefits. 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1 
Historic Preservation Policies:  
Planning Consents and Home Energy Efficiency Improvements 
 
  Not Listed or CA 
 
Conservation Areas 
 
Listed Buildings 
 
Replacement 
boiler/heating 
No consent needed No consent needed Listed Building consent may be required; 
consult with planning authority  
New boiler/heating No consent needed No consent needed Listed Building consent may be required; 
consult with planning authority 
New doors and 
windows 
Planning consent required 
for: some flats* 
Planning consent required for: 
some flats*; homes under relevant 
Article 4 Directions, especially for 
front facing windows 
Planning and 
Listed Building consents are required 
Loft insulation 
 
No consent needed No consent is usually required; 
consult with planning authority 
Listed Building consent may be required;  
consult with planning authority 
External wall 
insulation 
No consent is usually 
required** 
Planning consent is required Planning and 
Listed Building consents are required 
Cavity wall 
insulation 
No consent needed Planning consent may be required Planning and Listed Building consents are 
likely required: consult with planning 
authority 
Wind turbine No consent usually 
required 
Planning consent required for: places 
facing a highway, homes under 
relevant Article 4 Directions 
Planning and 
Listed Building consents are required 
Solar panels  No consent needed Planning consent required for: places 
facing a highway, homes under 
relevant Article 4 Directions 
Planning and 
Listed Building consents are required 
 
Ground & Air 
source heat pumps 
No consent needed Planning consent may be required; 
consult with planning authority 
Planning and 
Listed Building consents are required 
Notes: 
* Depending on the nature of the work, planning permission is needed when it is not exactly a like-for-like replacement. 
** Since January 2013 external wall insulation has been classed as an alteration for the purposes of “permitted development”, meaning 
planning permission is not required.  
Planning consent is a permission to proceed with a proposed development. Responsibility for granting permission generally lies with 
local planning authorities (usually the planning department of the district or borough council).  An application for planning permission 
may be refused. Planning applications are subject to fees: the standard planning application fee is currently £206 ($356).  
Article 4 Directions: These impose additional restrictions in many Conservation Areas by withdrawing specified permitted development 
rights. 
Listed Building Consent: These are separate from planning permissions i.e. in some cases both consents may be required. Listed Building 
consents are not subject to additional fees, although where a planning consent is required, the usual fee will apply.   
Consultations with planning authority: Many authorities charge for pre-application advice e.g. for advice on Listed Building consents 
fees range from nominal amounts up to £3,500 ($5,775). Source:  https://www.designingbuildings.co.uk/wiki/Charging_for_Listed_ 
Building_Consent_pre-application_advice#Fees_or_exclusions_for_others_services.  
Building regulations approval is needed for changes to homes irrespective of whether planning consent is required. Building regulations 
are standards for the design and construction of buildings that ensure health and safety in those buildings. A local authority building 
control approval verifies modifications are (or will be) in compliance with these standards. Building control fees vary by planning 
authority. For example, the fee for replacing under 10 windows in Liverpool in 2014 was between £135-210 (£270-420). Various 
Approved Schemes have operated since 2001. Using a tradesman registered under an Approved Scheme obviates the need to apply for 
building regulation approval. Building regulation requirements may be varied in some cases for Listed Buildings and for homes in 
Conservation Areas. 
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Table 2a 
Summary Statistics: Neighbourhood-Level Main Regression Sample 
 
 Obs. 
Mean 
Std. Dev. 
Min. Max.   overall between within 
Panel data 
Log per capita domestic energy consumption (kWh) 44,149 8.92 0.23 0.21 0.09 7.58 9.61 
Log real one year lag weighted energy price per kWh 44,149 1.79 0.20 0.13 0.15 1.22 2.73 
 Cross-sectional data    
Planning Variables        
Grade II Listed Buildings per 100 dwellings 5,665 1.41 2.68   0 27.00 
Share of dwellings in Conservation Area in % 5,665 9.33 15.69   0 100 
        
Census 2001 Variables        
Share degree educated in % 5,665 14.77 8.52   2.08 54.10 
Share lone parent in % 5,665 2.68 1.38   0.35 9.75 
Share owner-occupier in % 5,665 68.88 16.90   8.11 98.06 
Share ethnicity white in % 5,665 90.67 14.72   11.03 100 
Share aged 45-59 in % 5,665 18.80 3.58   4.47 29.61 
Share aged 60 or above in % 5,665 20.61 5.73   3.46 55.61 
Share Manager, Professional, Assoc. Professional  in % 5,665 39.80 12.48   13.07 82.21 
Share employed in % 5,665 45.88 6.61   17.25 67.32 
        
Dwelling characteristics        
Share dwellings built before 1900 in % 5,665 15.78 16.75   0 90.14 
Share dwellings built 1900-1918 in % 5,665 5.69 8.76   0 85.10 
Share dwellings built 1919-1929 in % 5,665 5.41 7.77   0 93.56 
Share dwellings built 1930-1939 in % 5,665 11.68 13.59   0 96.24 
Share dwellings built 1945-1964 in % 5,665 18.37 14.74   0 96.77 
Share dwellings built 1965-1982 in % 5,665 20.47 14.71   0 99.64 
Share dwellings built 1983-1999 in % 5,665 13.71 11.02   0 99.16 
Share dwellings built since 2000 in % 5,665 9.42 7.97   0 70.22 
Share flats in % 5,665 22.18 21.62   0 99.81 
Share terraced in % 5,665 27.53 17.16   0 94.66 
Share detached in % 5,665 25.70 21.13   0 85.23 
Share semi-detached in % 5,665 24.59 14.39   0 85.49 
        
Other        
Distance to commuting zone centre  (km) 5,665 0.11 0.08   0.001 0.62 
N’hood median household income in 2004 (£) 5,665 495.34 116.79   240 1120 
Notes: Planning variables reported in this Table are not standardised as in the regressions.  
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Table 2b 
Summary Statistics: Planning Authority-Level Regression Sample 
 
 Obs. 
Mean 
Std. Dev. 
Min. Max.   overall between within 
Panel data 
Total home energy efficiency installations 1,510 24,714 22,963 20,444 10,510 2,895 298,444 
Wall insulation 1,510 4,071 4,198 3,636 2,107 25 51,444 
New loft insulation  1,510 1,226 1,508 1,162 964 7 23,042 
Double glazing 604 5,447 4,447 4,215 1,427 619 55,096 
Heating systems 604 1,051 1,130 1,085 316 93 13,445 
New boilers 604 896 1,052 970 408 84 14,245 
Wall insulation per dwelling 1,510 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.03 0 0.25 
New loft insulation per dwelling 1,510 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0.11 
Double glazing per dwelling 604 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.02 0 0.22 
Heating systems per dwelling 604 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0.06 
New boilers per dwelling 604 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0.06 
Log real lagged weighted energy price per kWh 1,510 1.73 0.18 0.10 0.15 1.36 2.26 
Share age 16-45 in % 1,510 0.39 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.27 0.60 
Share age 45+ in % 1,510 0.43 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.20 0.59 
Share with degree in % 1,510 0.20 0.09 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.57 
Log real male FT wage 1,510 6.37 0.16 0.15 0.04 5.99 7.21 
Log heating degree days 1,510 1.74 0.10 0 0.10 1.63 1.92 
Log household count 1,510 10.61 0.55 0.55 0.04 8.73 12.72 
 Cross-sectional data    
Planning Variables        
Grade II Listed buildings per 100 dwellings 302 1.90 2.10   0.06 11.90 
Share of dwellings in Conservation Area in % 302 10.03 9.18   0.23 65.10 
Notes: Planning variables reported in this Table are not standardised as in the regressions.  
 
 
Table 3 
Energy Price Elasticities: OLS 
 
Dependent Variable: Log domestic energy 
consumption per person 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Log contemporaneous weighted energy price -0.0865***   0.00918 
 (0.00777)   (0.00860) 
Log one year lagged weighted energy price  -0.479***  -0.397*** 
  (0.00854)  (0.00925) 
Log two year lagged weighted energy price   -0.187*** -0.0680*** 
    (0.00458) (0.00457) 
     
Log heating degree days 0.0508*** 0.222*** 0.0789*** 0.203*** 
 (0.00239) (0.00328) (0.00236) (0.00339) 
Log planning authority male FT real median 
wage 
-0.0582*** -0.0210 -0.0393** -0.0193 
 (0.0188) (0.0161) (0.0165) (0.0163) 
     
Neighbourhood fixed effects √ √ √ √ 
Linear time trend x Region √ √ √ √ 
     
Observations 38,512 38,512 38,512 38,512 
Adj. R-squared 0.976 0.980 0.978 0.980 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at planning authority level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4 
Baseline Specifications: OLS, Domestic Energy Consumption 
 
Dep Var: Log domestic energy consumption per person  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
PANEL A: Listed Buildings            
Log one year lagged energy price  0.0633*** 0.0336*** 0.0305*** 0.0294*** 0.0302*** 0.0298*** 
× Grade II Listed per 100 dwellings (0.00340) (0.00287) (0.00274) (0.00334) (0.00330) (0.00449) 
Adj. R-squared 0.982 0.986 0.987 0.988 0.988 0.985 
PANEL B: Conservation Areas       
Log one year lagged energy price   0.0329*** 0.0220*** 0.0175*** 0.0206*** 0.0206*** 0.0211*** 
× Share dwellings in Conservation Area (0.00621) (0.00355) (0.00363) (0.00322) (0.00323) (0.00338) 
Adj. R-squared 0.981 0.986 0.987 0.988 0.988 0.985 
PANEL C: Both Historic Preservation Policies        
Log one year lagged energy price  0.0580*** 0.0292*** 0.0269*** 0.0245*** 0.0253*** 0.0199*** 
× Grade II Listed per 100 dwellings (0.00379) (0.00342) (0.00326) (0.00342) (0.00332) (0.00444) 
Log one year lagged energy price   0.0109 0.0129*** 0.0105** 0.0144*** 0.0143*** 0.0164*** 
× Share dwellings in Conservation Area (0.00765) (0.00435) (0.00418) (0.00335) (0.00329) (0.00350) 
Adj. R-squared 0.982 0.986 0.987 0.988 0.988 0.985 
       
Controls, Fixed Effects and Trends       
Log planning authority wages √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Neighbourhood fixed effects √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Linear time trend x Region √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Year fixed effects √ √     
2001 Census and 2004 income linear trends   √ √ √ √ √ 
commuting zone -by-year   √ √ √ √ 
Building age & type linear trends    √ √ √ 
Distance to commuting zone centre x energy price      √ √ 
Drop rural neighbourhoods & rural-urban linear trends       √ 
       
Observations 44,149 44,149 44,149 44,149 44,149 40,410 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at planning authority level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All policy variables are standardised. Energy price variable is 
a weighted average of real national gas and electricity prices, lagged one period. 2001 Census trends are linear time trends interacted with net household income in 2004; 
2001 share with degree; share lone parents; share owner-occupiers; share ethnicity white; share ages 45-59, share aged 60+; share managers, professionals, or associate 
professionals; share employed. Building age categories are share built pre-1900, share built between 1900 and 1918, share built between 1919 and 1929, share built 
between 1930 and 1939, share built between 1945 and 1964, share built between 1965 and 1982, share built 1983-1999 (omitted share built since 2000). Building type 
categories are share semi-detached, share flats and share terraced (omitted share detached). 
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Table 5 
Robustness Check: Alternative Estimation Approach (Stacked Regression) 
 
Dep Var: Log domestic energy consumption per person (1) (2) (3) 
    
Log one year lagged energy price 0.0393***  0.0267* 
× Grade II Listed per 100 dwellings (0.0121)  (0.0137) 
Log one year lagged energy price   0.0300*** 0.0231** 
× Share dwellings in Conservation Area  (0.00765) (0.00863) 
    
Controls, Fixed Effects and Trends    
Neighbourhood-by fuel type fixed effects √ √ √ 
Region-by fuel type linear trends √ √ √ 
Neighbourhood-by-year √ √ √ 
Fuel type-by-year √ √ √ 
2001 Census and 2004 income linear trends x fuel type √ √ √ 
Building age & type linear trends x fuel type √ √ √ 
Distance to commuting zone centre x energy price √ √ √ 
Drop rural neighbourhoods & rural-urban linear trends x 
fuel type  
√ √ √ 
    
Observations 80,836 80,836 80,836 
Adj. R-squared 0.996 0.996 0.996 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at planning authority level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1. All policy variables are standardised. Energy prices are lagged by one year.  
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Table 6 
Robustness Check: Panel Frequency and Lagged Energy Prices 
 
Dep Var: Log domestic energy per person  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  Current 
 prices 
Second  
lag 
Current  
& first lag 
First & 
 second lag 
First lag  
& first lead 
First lag  
& rat. exp. 
2006  
& 2013  
         
Log weighted energy price         
 x Grade II Listed per 100 dwellings  0.0237***  -0.00029   0.0217*** 0.0262*** 
  (0.00579)  (0.00631)   (0.00580) (0.00594) 
 x Share dwellings in Conservation Area  0.0198***  0.00503   0.0134*** 0.0178*** 
  (0.00380)  (0.00710)   (0.00370) (0.00439) 
Lag 1: Log energy price         
 x Grade II Listed per 100 dwellings    0.0202*** 0.0130** 0.0193***   
    (0.00483) (0.00518) (0.00407)   
 x Share dwellings in Conservation Area    0.0130* 0.0109*** 0.0163***   
    (0.00686) (0.00395) (0.00519)   
Lag 2: Log energy price         
 x Grade II Listed per 100 dwellings   0.0157***  0.00713*    
   (0.00440)  (0.00369)    
 x Share dwellings in Conservation Area   0.0156***  0.00873**    
   (0.00358)  (0.00405)    
Lead 1: Log energy price         
 x Grade II Listed per 100 dwellings      0.00124   
      (0.00633)   
 x Share dwellings in Conservation Area      0.00018   
      (0.00627)   
         
Forward looking: Log energy price       -0.0295  
 x Grade II Listed per 100 dwellings       (0.00373)  
       0.0420  
 x Share dwellings in Conservation Area       (0.00347)  
         
Controls, Fixed Effects and Trends  √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
         
Observations  40,410 35,259 40,410 35,259 40,140 40,140 9,764 
Adj. R-squared  0.985 0.986 0.985 0.986 0.985 0.985 0.978 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at planning authority level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All policy variables are standardised. Energy prices lags or leads as indicated. 
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Table 7 
Mechanism: Energy Prices and Energy Efficiency Installations 
 
Panel timespan:  2006-2010    2006-2007  
Dependent variable: All installations Wall insulation Loft insulation  Double 
glazing 
Heating New boiler 
Nature of upgrade: Internal/External Internal/External Internal  External Internal Internal 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
        
Log one year lagged energy price  -8,679*** -1,657*** -664***  -1,203*** -859*** -958*** 
 × Grade II Listed per 100 dwellings (2,464) (547) (233)  (589) (177) (254) 
Log one year lagged energy price  -4,353* -1,347** -108  -1,076 163 -319 
 × Share dwellings in Conservation Area (2,525) (567) (257)  (745) (197) (234) 
        
Log household count 3,159 751 371  1,507 544 161 
 (4,103) (931) (433)  (1,386) (379) (399) 
        
Controls, Fixed Effects and Trends        
Planning authority fixed effects √ √ √  √ √ √ 
Year fixed effects √ √ √  √ √ √ 
Building age and type linear trends √ √ √  √ √ √ 
Demographic controls and wages √ √ √  √ √ √ 
         
Observations 1,510 1,510 1,510  604 604 604 
Adj. R-squared 0.916 0.874 0.811  0.939 0.934 0.854 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at planning authority level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample includes 304 planning authorities with 
Conservation Area data. Installations data from the HEED database. Wall insulations include cavity wall and external wall insulation. Loft insulations capture new 
installations but exclude upgrades to existing insulation. All installations include a wide variety of energy efficiency installations e.g. wall insulation, loft 
insulations, new boiler, and heating, microgeneration and energy efficient lighting. Energy price variable is a weighted average of real national gas and electricity 
prices, lagged one period. Demographic controls include time varying demographic controls: share with degree, share age 16-45, share age 45+ and log FT male 
real average wage. Columns 4-6 based on 2006-2007 as data for these installations only held for this period. 
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Table 8 
Mechanism: Energy Efficiency & Consumption 
 
Dep Var: Log domestic energy 
consumption per person 
(1) (2) 
   
New boiler -0.0711*** -0.0703*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) 
   
Loft insulation -0.0247*** -0.0244*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) 
   
Wall insulation -0.0771*** -0.0793*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0007) 
   
Dwelling fixed effects √ √ 
Fuel poverty decile-by-year FE  √ 
Deprivation decile-by-year FE  √ 
   
Observations 27,803,027 27,803,027 
Adj. R-squared 0.703 0.703 
Notes: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Based on NEED database 2005-
2012. Estimates based on all English dwelling types and sizes. 
 
 
Table 9 
Counterfactual Scenarios 
 
 
 
Total Gas + Electricity (GWh) 
 
 
Predicted GWh 
2006 -2013 
cumulative 
Difference 
GWh 
 
Difference 
£ million 
 
Difference 
$ million 
 
Difference 
CO2 
(MtCO2e) 
Difference 
% 
        
 
Baseline Prediction 2,440,836      
 
(Actual Energy consumption 2,440,785)      
Panel A: Remove All Historic Preservation Policies      
(1) Conservation Areas  2,399,426  -41,410  -3,308 -5,459 -11.4 -1.7% 
(2) Listed Buildings  2,411,330  -29,506  -2,357 -3,889 -8.2 -1.2% 
(3) Both Policies  2,371,161  -69,675  -5,566 -9,185 -19.2 -2.9% 
Panel B: Reduce to 1980 Levels      
(4) Conservation Areas  2,425,469  -15,367  -1,228 -2,026 -4.2 -0.6% 
(5) Listed Buildings  2,425,210  -15,627  -1,248 -2,060 -4.3 -0.6% 
(6) Both Policies  2,409,989  -30,848  -2,464 -4,066 -8.5 -1.3% 
Panel C: Reduce by 1 Standard Deviation      
(7) Conservation Areas  2,416,402  -24,435  -1,952 -3,221 -6.8 -1.0% 
(8) Listed Buildings  2,419,068  -21,768  -1,739 -2,869 -6.0 -0.9% 
(9) Both Policies  2,395,062  -45,774  -3,657 -6,034 -12.6 -1.9% 
Panel D: Increase by 1 Standard Deviation      
(10) Conservation Areas  2,514,147   73,310  5,857 9,664 20.3 3.0% 
(11) Listed Buildings  2,530,531   89,694  7,166 11,823 24.8 3.7% 
(12) Both Policies  2,606,551   165,715  13,239 21,844 45.8 6.8% 
Notes: Table uses conversion factors for 2010 Electricity kWh = 0.523 kg CO2 and Natural gas kWh = 0.185 kg CO2 (Source: DECC’s 
“Tool for calculation of CO2 emissions from organisations”). Calculations assume natural gas is 73% of total domestic (gas + electricity) 
based on the average total consumption in the sample neighbourhoods in the sample timeframe. The average unit prices for electricity and 
gas are taken from DECC publications for 2013 paying on credit, 15.8 pence (26 cents) per kWh electricity and 5.1 pence (8.4 cents)  per 
kWh domestic gas. 
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FIGURES 
 
Fig. 1 
Cross-Sectional Correlation between Listed Buildings and Domestic Energy Consumption 
 
 
Notes: Measured at neighbourhood-level. Red line = best fit. Correlation = -0.21. 
Sources: Historic England and DECC. 
 
Fig. 2  
Conservation Areas in England 
 
Note: Data missing for 50 planning authorities (blue). 
Source: Historic England. 
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Fig. 3 
Conservation Areas by Year of Designation 
 
Source: Historic England. 
 
Fig. 4  
Listed Buildings in England 
 
Source: Historic England. 
  
 36 
Fig. 5 
Listed Buildings by Year of Listing 
 
 
Source: Historic England. 
 
 
Fig. 6 
Impact of Strict Historic Preservation Policy on Investments in Home Energy  
Efficiency Investments and Energy Consumption 
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Fig. 7 
UK Real Retail Electricity and Gas Price Indices, 1960-2015 
 
 
Note: Year 2005 is normalised to 1.  
Source: Digest of UK Energy Statistics (DUKES). 
 
 
Fig. 8 
UK Real Energy Unit Costs and Production Indices 2000-2014 
 
  Note: Year 2000 is normalised to 1.  
Source: DECC.   
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A: Detailed Description of Data and Sources 
 
This appendix provides details on the various sources and computation of variables used in our 
empirical analysis. 
The analysis rests on a dataset of domestic energy consumption, historic preservation policies, 
and control variables at the Middle Layer Super Output Area (neighbourhood) spatial scale. 
Middle Layer Super Output Areas are neighbourhood-level statistical geographies introduced 
following the 2001 Census. The 6,781 neighbourhoods in England with which we perform our 
analysis were designed to be relatively homogeneous in terms of their populations and contain 
between 2,000 and 6,000 households. Data for domestic energy consumption are publicly 
available through the Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC) sub-national 
consumption statistics. The dataset records the total amount of domestic mains gas distributed 
through the National Transmission System and electricity consumed in each neighbourhood per 
year in kilowatt hours (kWh) between 2006 and 2013.29 Population data from the Office of 
National Statistic (ONS) (mid-year Population Estimates for Lower Layer Super Output Areas 
in England and Wales by Single Year of Age and Sex) are then matched into the data. A small 
number of neighbourhoods that lack data for energy consumption or population are dropped. 
Our main domestic energy measure is generated by taking the natural log of energy 
consumption, summed across these two energy types, divided by population.30 
We also provide a panel analysis of home energy efficiency installations at the planning 
authority-level. This second panel is constructed using data on home energy efficiency 
installations from the Home Energy Efficiency Database (HEED) held by the Energy Saving 
Trust. The data is collected from surveys, and the data providers warn that it cannot necessarily 
be regarded as representative of the housing stock as a whole. This is because much of the data 
comes from government-led installation programmes (such as CERT, CESP and EAP). As a 
result, it is biased towards measures installed in those schemes, such as insulated cavity walls 
and lofts. Home energy efficiency installations are not available to us at the neighbourhood-
level, so by necessity the spatial units in this panel are the 354 pre-2009 planning authorities in 
England. The panel runs only from 2005 to 2010 after which planning authorities were 
reorganised. We use the HEED data that records the total number of annual installations, 
exploiting the richness of installation types, including wall insulations, loft insulations, double 
glazing, new boilers, new heating systems, micro-generation and energy efficient lighting. We 
treat these installations as a stock (because the upgrades we focus on are durable) and specify 
dependent variables based on installations in levels. Control variables in this panel include 
                                                 
29Some data from before 2006 are available, but much of the earlier data were collected on a different basis or are 
classified as experimental data so we use 2006 as our base year. As discussed, we use 2005 neighbourhood energy 
consumption data to weight our demand shifter.  
30 Although the gas data are weather corrected, unlike the electricity data, DECC (2014, 34) reports that “Despite 
these differences, the combined electricity and gas [data] provide a good indication of overall annual household 
energy consumption in Great Britain at local authority, MSOA/IGZ and LSOA level, due to the robustness of the 
data collections and collation process”. 
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household counts, share with degree education, and FT male median wages from NOMIS, and 
population age groups based on information obtained from the ONS.  
We also explore the quantitative effect of home energy installations on domestic energy 
consumption using the National Energy Efficiency Data-Framework (NEED) End-User 
License File. This provides a panel of household energy (gas & electricity) consumption and 
property characteristics for roughly 3.8 million dwellings in England during the period 2005-
2012 that have had energy performance certificates issued. The data set is anonymized but 
contains property characteristics (property age, type, and size brackets; region; area-based 
deciles for household fuel poverty and neighbourhood deprivation), as well as energy efficiency 
variables (energy efficiency band; gas heating; Economy 7 electricity; new boiler, cavity wall 
and loft installations with year of installation). The public version of the dataset, however, lacks 
information about households, tenure, and the precise location of dwellings. 
We merge annual energy prices into all these data sets. Real energy price measures originate 
from DECC’s Quarterly Energy Prices publications (Table 2.3.3). We use UK average energy 
prices per unit for gas and electricity for customers paying on credit as data for this customer 
group are available for the whole period 2005-2013. Per unit (kWh) costs are generated from 
billing data by assuming a fixed annual consumption. They reflect the prices of all energy 
suppliers and include standing charges and Value Added Tax. We specify our demand shifters 
by taking the weighted average of these national unit costs. Our main results use time invariant 
neighbourhood-specific weights given by the share of each energy type consumed in the 
neighbourhood in 2005, i.e. the gas weight for a neighbourhood equals gas consumption in that 
neighbourhood in 2005 divided by total gas and electricity consumption in that neighbourhood 
in 2005. As a robustness check we use weights based on the time varying national average share 
of energy consumption for all neighbourhoods in our sample. In both cases, weighted average 
prices are converted into constant 2013 prices using the GDP deflator available from Her 
Majesty’s Treasury before we take the natural log.  
Our main right-hand side variables measure two widespread historic preservation policies: 
Conservation Areas and Listed Buildings. We obtain two shapefiles (for 2008 and 2012) from 
Historic England (formerly English Heritage) with details of the spatial scope of individual 
Conservation Areas in England. Because data for some areas are missing in each file, we 
combine the files to minimize gaps but remained short of data for 50 Local Authorities (out of 
354). Throughout the analysis, we focus solely on the 5,759 neighbourhoods for which we have 
Conservation Area data. 
A dataset of Listed Buildings is downloaded from the Historic England website. As the data do 
not identify building type, we cannot easily distinguish between commercial and residential 
Listed Buildings. However, the dataset records three levels of listing which denotes their level 
of historical or architectural interest: according to Historic England Grade buildings I are of 
“exceptional interest”, Grade II* “particular importance” and Grade I of “special interest”.  
We construct several time invariant variables capturing the extent of local restrictions on 
domestic buildings at the neighbourhood- and planning authority-level from this information. 
Our principal measures are based on the estimated proportion of residential addresses in each 
neighbourhood or planning authority that are covered by each of the preservation policies. To 
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generate these measures, we first obtain counts of residential addresses for each postcode in 
England from the Postcode Address File contained in the 2010 National Statistics Postcode 
Directory, which we then collapse to the neighbourhood and planning authority levels. 
To measure the impact of Listed Buildings, in our baseline specifications we divide the number 
of Grade II Listed Buildings by the total number of residential addresses in each neighbourhood 
or planning authority. This choice reflects our assumption that Grade II Listed Buildings are 
more likely to be residential dwellings than higher grades. As a robustness check we also use 
the total count of Listed Buildings in each neighbourhood as the numerator (see Column 6 of 
Appendix Table 2). Further checks, in which we use the text contained in the address field to 
remove non-residential Listed Buildings, are reported in the Web Appendix. 
To measure the impact of Conservation Areas, in our baseline specifications we divide the 
number of residential addresses that lay within Conservation Areas by the total number of 
residential addresses in each neighbourhood or planning authority. This is possible because the 
postcode centroid allows us to identify which individual postcodes are within Conservation 
Areas and which are not. As a robustness check we use a measure based on the share of 
developed land in each neighbourhood that is within a Conservation Area (see Column 5 of 
Appendix Table 2). The denominator in this robustness measure is the area of land in urban or 
semi-urban use in each neighbourhood, developed using data from the Land Cover Map of 
Great Britain 1990.  
In general, our empirical estimations treat historic preservation policies as if they were time 
invariant. The justification for this assumption is that new historic preservation designations in 
our sample period comprise a very small proportion of the stock of Listed Buildings and 
Conservation Areas. Of the 8,349 Conservation Areas in our dataset, 302 (or 3.7%) were newly 
designated in the period 2005-2013 while 5,049 out of 376,025 (or 1.3%) Listed Buildings were 
added to the list in the same period. To ensure that this does not bias or attenuate out results we 
verified robustness to dropping neighbourhoods that contained a newly designated 
Conservation Area as well as any buildings that were listed after 2005 from our counts of Listed 
Buildings (see an earlier working paper version of this study: Hilber et al., 2017). 
We use a third—non-historic—preservation policy, Green Belts, as a placebo test (see 
Appendix Table 3). Shapefiles for Green Belts are not released as officially-sanctioned data. 
However, the area of land within Green Belts for each Local Authority is released in spreadsheet 
format by the Department for Communities and Local Government. We also obtain a GIS map 
of Green Belts as they existed in 2011 from the website www.sharegeo.ac.uk, and estimate the 
number of residential addresses in land designated as Green Belt at the planning authority-level 
using these two data sources.  
Our control variables include a variety of trends and fixed effects. We use the 2001 Census to 
construct a series of share variables normalised by contemporaneous population at the 
neighbourhood-level: share of residents with degree, share employed, share owner-occupiers, 
share lone parents, share aged 45-59, share aged 60 or more. To take account of the possibility 
that the stock of housing could determine sensitivity of areas to energy prices, we extract 
Valuation Office Agency (VOA) data for the age (share built pre-1900, share built between 
1900 and 1918, share built between 1919 and 1929, share built between 1930 and 1939, share 
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built between 1945 and 1964, share built between 1965 and 1982, share built 1983-1999 and 
share built after 2000) and type (detached, semi-detached, terrace, flat) of housing stock in each 
neighbourhood and planning authority. These data date from 2014. We also generate additional 
time varying controls by allowing for flexible commuting zone and household income trends. 
The latter is based on estimated neighbourhood household net income in 2004/5. The choice of 
this strategy reflects the unavailability of any time varying income data at the neighbourhood-
scale. 
In robustness checks, we replace the 2001 Census trends with linear time trends interacted with 
the same share variables calculated using the 2011 Census, as well as the change in the same 
share variables between these two Censuses (see Columns 1 and 2 of Appendix Table 2).  
Finally, in some specifications we control for urban-rural issues on the basis that rural places 
often do not have access to mains gas and will likely have a different mix of domestic energy 
types and exposure to fuel prices. We do so by dropping places where mains gas consumption 
is zero and those places that were recorded as being in a “sparse” or “village” setting in the 
Census. We also interact a trend variable with the remaining rural-urban classifications, 
namely: Rural town and fringe; Urban city and town; Urban major conurbation; Urban minor 
conurbation. 
Appendix B: Robustness Checks 
 
In this appendix, we document supplementary robustness checks we undertake in order to 
confirm the validity of our findings. Descriptive statistics for all variables used in these 
regressions are found in Appendix Table 1 while details about the underlying data are contained 
in Appendix A. 
The first additional set of robustness checks in Appendix Table 2 reports regressions that vary 
individual elements of our preferred specification in Column 6 of Panel C in Table 4. One 
potential concern with our baseline specification could be that we do not adequately control for 
correlated trends in energy consumption. To mitigate this, Panel A of Appendix Table 2 
demonstrates that our findings are largely insensitive to alternative trend specifications, by 
replacing 2001 Census trends in Column 1 with 2011 Census trends, and with trend variables 
interacted with the change in the share variables occurring between the two Censuses, in 
Column 2. In Column 3, we interact income in 2004 with energy prices instead of the linear 
trends we use in our baseline specification. In Column 4, we push this approach further by 
additionally replacing the linear trend with energy prices in the interactions with the Census 
and building age and type variables. In all cases, results are materially unchanged. 
Columns 5-6 demonstrate that findings are also robust with respect to alternative specifications 
of the planning variables. In Column 5, we re-specify the Conservation Area measure as the 
share of developed (urban and suburban) land in a Conservation Area using land cover data 
from a 1991 survey. In Column 6, we re-specify the Listed Building measure by counting all 
Listed Buildings rather than Grade II ones only. In Column 7 we allow for differential linear 
trends either side of the 2008 recession. 
Panel B of Appendix Table 2 reports various further robustness checks. In the first three 
columns we vary the sample restriction. In Column 8 we drop the one year with negative energy 
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price growth. In Column 9 we relax the restriction in the baseline specification that drops a 
small number of cells that experience large (>25%) year-on-year changes in energy 
consumption. In Column 10, we show our findings are robust to removing all neighbourhoods 
in London. The final four columns focus on alternative uses of energy variables in our 
specifications. In Column 11, we instrument log weighted energy prices using log North Sea 
gas production. In Column 12, we weight energy prices using national proportions of each type 
of energy consumed (meaning the demand shifter is common to all neighbourhoods). Finally, 
in Columns 13 and 14 we use per capita gas consumption and electricity consumption as the 
dependent variable. All told, the results in this table suggest robustness to a variety of changes 
in specification and underlying data content. 
In a second robustness check, we re-run our regressions using a third type of preservation 
policy: Green Belts. Green Belts surround many urban areas in England and are covered by 
strict rules that make it very difficult for developers to build new houses inside areas under this 
planning designation. However, unlike Conservation Areas and Listed Buildings, there is little 
reason to expect Green Belts will act as a constraint on investments in home energy efficiency 
improvements. Thus, we consider regressions using Green Belts as a placebo test of our main 
results. In the first column of Appendix Table 3 we replicate the specifications from Table 4 
Column 6 but, as our preservation policy measure, use the number of dwellings in the Green 
Belt in each planning authority. In the second column, we then include all three preservation 
policies jointly. The coefficients on Green Belt interactions are insignificant while the 
coefficients on the Conservation Area and Listed Building interactions are largely unaffected 
by the inclusion of Green Belts. Columns 3 and 4 show that we reach similar conclusions when 
we repeat this exercise using the stacked regression approach.  
Our third robustness check, a pairwise fixed effect approach, is designed to control for 
potentially confounding factors such as income in a less parametric way. In particular, we repeat 
the specification in equation (3) but now exclusively rely on comparisons between 
neighbourhoods that are almost identical on a candidate confounding factor. We do this by 
adding a neighbourhood pair-by-year fixed effect where pairs constitute adjacent observations 
when ranking neighbourhoods on either:  average house prices in 2001-2004; household income 
in 2004; share homes built before 1945; average annual change in house prices between 2004 
and 2013; change in share with degree between the 2001 and 2011 Census; or change in share 
of lone parents between the 2001 and 2011 Census. Our findings are largely unchanged.  
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Appendix Tables 
 
Appendix Table 1 
Summary Statistics: Additional Neighbourhood Robustness Variables 
 
 Obs. 
Mean 
Std. Dev. 
Min. Max.   overall between within 
Panel data 
Log lag energy price per kWh: alternative weighting 44,149 1.79 0.17 0.01 0.17 1.47 2.00 
Log North Sea gas production (million cubic meters) 44,149 10.98 0.28 0.03 0.28 10.55 11.35 
 Cross-sectional data    
Planning Variables        
Share of planning authority dwellings in Green 
Belt in % 5,665 1.95 4.01   0 36.75 
        
Census 2011 Variables        
Share degree educated in % 5,665 22.42 9.79   3.51 62.62 
Share lone parent in % 5,665 2.97 1.36   0.19 9.64 
Share owner-occupier in % 5,665 64.54 17.11   7.58 96.53 
Share ethnicity white in % 5,665 85.84 18.52   5.62 99.46 
Share aged 45-59 in % 5,665 19.50 3.19   2.99 27.84 
Share aged 60 or above in % 5,665 22.47 7.45   3.15 57.14 
Share Manager, Professional, Assoc. Professional  in % 5,665 40.46 12.72   11.67 83.92 
Share employed in % 5,665 47.67 5.91   22.24 72.01 
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Appendix Table 2 
Robustness Check: Alternative Specifications 
 
Dep Var: Log 
domestic energy 
consumption per 
person 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Change relative to 
baseline spec: 
2011 Census 
trends 
∆2001-2011 
Census trends 
Replace 
income x 
linear trend 
with income 
x energy 
prices 
As (3), but 
also replace 
linear trend 
with energy 
prices for 
Census & 
building type 
& age cntrls 
Share land in 
CA instead of 
share dwellings 
All Listed 
Buildings 
instead of 
Grade II 
Allow for 
different trends 
pre and post 
2008 recession 
 
Panel A: Trends & Alternative Historic Preservation Variables 
Log one year lagged  0.0146*** 0.0237*** 0.0177*** 0.0194*** 0.0251*** 0.0207*** 0.0210*** 
 energy price × Listed (0.00448) (0.00462) (0.00457) (0.00466) (0.00429) (0.00452) (0.00424) 
Log one year lagged  0.0141*** 0.0153*** 0.0177*** 0.0177*** 0.0122*** 0.0161*** 0.0169*** 
 energy price × CA (0.00365) (0.00368) (0.00363) (0.00409) (0.00306) (0.00346) (0.00364) 
        
Controls, Fixed Effects 
and Trends 
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
        
Observations 40,410 40,410 40,410 40,410 40,410 40,410 40,410 
Adj. R-squared 0.986 0.986 0.985 0.984 0.985 0.985 0.985 
        
 (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Change relative to 
baseline spec: 
Drop year  
(i.e., 2010) 
with falling 
energy prices 
No sample 
restriction 
No London 
neighbour-
hoods  
IV energy 
prices with 
North Sea 
gas 
production  
Weight prices 
with national    
energy split in 
2005  
Gas 
consumption 
dependent 
variable 
Electricity 
consumption 
dependent 
variable 
 
Panel B: Further Robustness Checks 
 
Log one year lagged  0.0201*** 0.0198*** 0.0191*** 0.0203*** 0.0176*** 0.0160*** 0.0117*** 
 energy price × Listed (0.00464) (0.00513) (0.00401) (0.00587) (0.00411) (0.00471) (0.00589) 
Log one year lagged  0.0170*** 0.0191*** 0.0125*** 0.0180*** 0.0159*** 0.0176*** 0.0165*** 
 energy price × CA (0.00341) (0.00387) (0.00282) (0.00415) (0.00343) (0.00361) (0.00523) 
        
Controls, Fixed Effects 
and Trends 
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
        
Observations 35,245 41,279 31,684 40,410 40,410 40,410 40,410 
Adj. R-squared 0.985 0.946 0.986 0.985 0.985 0.990 0.927 
Kleibergen-Paap F    4,318    
Notes: Standard errors clustered at planning authority level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All policy 
variables are standardised. 
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Appendix Table 3 
Robustness Check: Placebo using Green Belt 
 
Approach: --- Weighted --- --- Stacked --- 
Dep Var: Log domestic energy consumption per person   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Log one year lagged energy price  -0.0025 -0.0020 0.0061 0.0074 
× Share planning authority dwellings in Green Belt (0.00223) (0.0226) (0.00714) (0.00705) 
Log one year lagged energy price   0.0200***  0.0261* 
× Grade II Listed per 100 dwellings  (0.00441)  (0.0136) 
Log one year lagged energy price   0.0163***  0.0239** 
× Share dwellings in Conservation Area  (0.00350)  (0.00868) 
     
Controls, Fixed Effects and Trends √ √ √ √ 
     
Observations 40,410 40,410 80,836 80,836 
Adj. R-squared 0.985 0.985 0.996 0.996 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at planning authority level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
All policy variables are standardised. Energy prices are lagged by one year. 
 
 
Appendix Table 4 
Robustness check: Pairwise Fixed Effects 
Dep Var: Log domestic energy 
consumption per person 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Pair defined by rank on: Average 
house prices 
Household 
income 
Share 
homes built 
pre ‘45 
∆ house 
prices  
∆ share with 
degree 
∆ share lone 
parents 
       
Log one year lagged energy  0.0191*** 0.0247*** 0.0194*** 0.0204*** 0.0220*** 0.0191*** 
 price × Listed (0.00475) (0.00574) (0.00510) (0.0546) (0.0477) (0.00510) 
       
Log one year lagged energy  0.0118*** 0.0133*** 0.0173*** 0.0141*** 0.0177*** 0.0168*** 
price × Conservation Area (0.00361) (0.00413) (0.00413) (0.00380) (0.00375) (0.00375) 
       
Controls, Fixed Effects and Trends √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Pair-by-Year √ √ √ √ √ √ 
       
Observations 39,518 39,612 39,520 39,512 39,566 39,536 
Adj. R-squared 0.984 0.984 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.983 
       
Notes: Standard errors clustered at planning authority level in parentheses, *** p<0.001, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All policy 
variables are standardised.  Regressions are as baseline specification but additionally include a pair by year fixed effect where 
pairs are defined as adjacent observations when ranking neighbourhoods on variable indicated: in Column 1 average house 
prices in 2001-2004; in Column 2 household income in 2004; in Column 3 share homes built before 1945; in Column 4 average 
annual change in house prices between 2004 and 2013; in Column 5 change in share with degree between the 2001 and 2011 
Census; in Column 6 change in share lone parents between  the 2001 and 2011 Census.   
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WEB APPENDIX 
 
This Web Appendix documents further ancillary regressions. 
Web Appendix Table 1 provides reassurance that our proxy for Listed Buildings is a reasonable 
one. In our baseline specifications, we compute the Listed Building measure using the number 
of Grade II Listed Buildings per 100 dwellings. This is a proxy for the number of Listed 
residential dwellings which we do not observe in our data. It has the benefit of simplicity and 
transparency. In Column 1 of Web Appendix Table 1 we repeat our baseline specification for 
reference. For the two remaining columns we have generated new measures of Listed Buildings 
per 100 dwellings based on information in Grade II Listed Building names. In Column 2 we 
attempt to purge non-residential buildings from our counts of Listed Buildings. We do so by 
removing any Listings that contain around 40 keywords, such as “Church”, “Cathedral”, 
“Factory”, “Office”, “Hotel”, “Library”, “Museum”, “Shop”, “Wall”, “Monument”, 
“Warehouse”, “Headstone”) but do not contain a number (typically a street address) or words 
suggestive of a residential address (“Street”, “Avenue”, “Road” etc.). This latter condition is 
adopted because many residential addresses contain a keyword (e.g. “8, Upper Church Street”). 
Using this procedure, we exclude around 10% of Grade II Listed Buildings (or 35,000 Listings 
Buildings). Findings using this alternative measure are almost identical to our baseline results. 
In Column 3 we attempt to allow for a Listing covering multiple residential units i.e. dwellings. 
We do so by first identifying Listed Building names that suggest a Listing covers more than 
one dwelling, and then where possible assigning that Listed Building a number of homes that 
is suggested by the text. For example, if the text contains a string such as “1, 2, and 3a Upper 
Church Street”, we assign it three Listed Buildings; “1 & 2 Upper Church Street” is assigned 
two listed dwellings. Sometimes it is not possible to identify the number of homes covered 
(e.g. “Cottages in Upper Church Street”) and in this case we make an assumption. By this 
process we assign multiple listed homes to around 35,000 Listed Buildings. Results when using 
this alternative measure are again highly similar to our baseline findings. Although the 
coefficient is slightly smaller than the baseline specification, the overall effect is very similar. 
This is because the coefficient tells us the effect of a one standard deviation increase from the 
mean, and the smaller coefficient in Column 3 is offset by the fact that the standard deviation 
of this measure is slightly larger (2.90 for Column 3 compared to 2.67 in the baseline 
specification).  
Web Appendix Table 2 explores the effect of outliers in preservation policies on our main 
estimates. Column 1 corresponds to our baseline estimate from Table 4, panel C, Column 6. In 
Columns 2 and 3 we drop, respectively, neighbourhoods in the top decile of Listed Buildings 
per 100 dwellings and neighbourhoods in the top decile of the proportion of homes in 
Conservation Areas (CAs). In Column 4 we implement the two restrictions concurrently. 
Around one third of neighbourhoods in the top decile of prevalence for one policy is also in 
the top decile for the other: we lose some further neighbourhoods where these become 
singletons conditional on our fixed effects. Column 5 repeats the specification in Column 4 but 
now additionally drops neighbourhoods in the bottom decile for either preservation policy. 
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Results are less precisely estimated but remain broadly comparable to our baseline model 
throughout.  
Web Appendix Table 3 checks for non-linearities in neighbourhoods with different intensities 
of preservation. This undertaking is not straightforward because our main results are estimates 
of the extent to which preservation policies modify the underlying energy price elasticity, and 
these underlying elasticities may themselves vary.  
Notwithstanding this caveat, we split the neighbourhoods into quartiles of the respective 
preservation policy measures, to estimate a baseline effect. Subsequently, we test for 
statistically significant differences from this baseline in the first, second, and third quartiles. 
For simplicity, we do this for each of the preservation policies separately, that is, we test for 
differences across the quartiles for one policy while imposing a common effect for the other 
policy. In Columns 2 and 3 we estimate the effect of Conservation Areas in different quartiles. 
Column 2 is akin to our baseline model, while in Column 3 we allow for differential trends in 
the different quartiles by interacting several of our control trends (region trends; rural-urban 
trends; and income trends) with a quartile indicator. 
We find little evidence of non-linearities for CA effects. For example, in Column 2 the baseline 
effect of CAs across all CA-quartiles is 0.0170. This can be interpreted as the effect in the top 
quartile. The effect in other quartiles can be calculated by adding the baseline effect and the 
additional quartile-specific estimates. However, these quartile specific effects are not 
statistically distinguishable from 0. The same findings arise in Column 3.  
Non-linearities are more evident in Listed Building effects. For example, in Column 4, we find 
that the effect in the top two quartiles is 0.0152; while the implied effect in the bottom quartile 
is 0.0459 (i.e., 0.0152+0.0343) and in the second quartile it is 0.0424 (i.e., 0.0152+0.0272). 
This is suggestive of greater effects of Listed Buildings in the least preserved areas, which 
could reflect possible social interactions/ learning around technology adoption in areas with 
more dwellings covered by historic preservation. However, we should caveat that (a) 
differences are only marginally significant, particularly when we include quartile specific 
trends in Column 5 and (b) the underlying energy price elasticity in these quartiles may be 
systematically different to the elasticity elsewhere.  
Web Appendix Table 4 provides the full output for our baseline specification. 
Web Appendix Table 5 provides robustness checks on the planning authority-level regressions 
reported in the main body of the paper by re-specifying the dependent variable. Specifically, 
in Columns 1 to 3 we normalise the stock of all installations using the count of dwellings. This 
yields statistically significant effects for the two preservation policies individually, but when 
both are included simultaneously only the Listed Building coefficient is significant.  
In columns 4 to 6 we obtain qualitatively similar findings when we specify the dependent 
variable as 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝐿𝑃𝐴𝑡
𝑑𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝐿𝑃𝐴
)  −  𝑙𝑛 (1 −
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝐿𝑃𝐴𝑡
𝑑𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝐿𝑃𝐴
), where the counts of dwellings are 
for the year 2010. We use this formulation, rather than the log odds ratio of market shares 
specified in Gillingham and Bollinger (2017), because in our setting households can make 
multiple installations of the same type (e.g. adding additional energy efficient windows, or 
additional loft insulation) or of different types. It is thus unclear how to define market share.  
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Web Appendix Table 6, finally, provides further support for our proposed mechanism. In 
Columns 1 to 3 we show the reduced form estimates at the planning authority-level where we 
regress log per capita energy prices on preservation policies interacted with the energy price 
demand shifter and controls in an planning authority-version of equation (4). These reduced 
form effects, which are the actual effects of the policy, are reasonably close to the 
neighbourhood estimates in Table 4, although, at the planning authority level the magnitude of 
the coefficients on Listed Buildings and CAs are more or less swapped around. In Columns 4 
to 6, we report IV estimates, where we instrument total installations (rescaled by dividing by 
1000) with preservation policies interacted with the energy price demand shifter. The first 
stages are shown in the bottom panel. These IV estimates qualitatively support our mechanism 
in that they suggest that preservation polies affect energy consumption through an energy 
efficiency investment mechanism.  
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WEB APPENDIX TABLES 
 
 
Web Appendix Table 1 
Listed Building Additional Robustness Checks: OLS 
 
Dep Var: Log domestic energy 
consumption per person  
(1) (2) (3) 
 Baseline Residential 
LB only 
Allow for multiple 
homes per listed  
    
Log lagged energy price × Listed 0.0199*** 0.0206*** 0.0182*** 
 (0.00444) (0.00451) (0.00421) 
      
Log lagged energy price ×  CA 0.0164*** 0.0161*** 0.0159*** 
 (0.00350) (0.00343) (0.00351) 
    
Controls, Fixed Effects, Trends √ √ √ 
    
    
Observations 40,410 40,410 40,410 
Adj. R-squared 0.985 0.985 0.985 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at planning authority level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
 
 
 
Web Appendix Table 2 
Outliers: OLS 
 
Dep Var: Log domestic energy 
consumption per person  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Baseline Drop top 
10% CA 
Drop top 
10% Listed 
Drop top 
10% both 
+ drop bottom 
10% both  
      
Log lagged energy price × Listed 0.0199*** 0.0219*** 0.0269*** 0.0280*** 0.0301*** 
 (0.00444) (0.00490) (0.00768) (0.00768) (0.00857) 
Log lagged energy price ×  CA   0.0164*** 0.0145*** 0.0174*** 0.0140** 0.0112* 
 (0.00350) (0.00534) (0.00380) (0.00552) (0.00576) 
      
Controls, Fixed Effects, Trends √ √ √ √ √ 
      
Observations 44,140 36,576 38,603 35,585 19,022 
Adj. R-squared 0.985 0.986 0.986 0.986 0.988 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at planning authority level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
  
  
50 
 
Web Appendix Table 3 
Non-linearities: OLS 
 
Dep Var: Log domestic energy 
consumption per person  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Baseline CA quartile interactions Listed quartile interactions 
      
Log lagged energy price × Listed 0.0199*** 0.0202*** 0.0236*** 0.0152*** 0.0162*** 
 (0.00444) (0.00438) (0.00454) (0.00477) (0.00474) 
Log lagged energy price ×  CA   0.0164*** 0.0170*** 0.0155*** 0.0154*** 0.0132*** 
 (0.00350) (0.00428) (0.00449) (0.00353) (0.00320) 
      
  × lowest quartile indicator  -0.00711 0.00699 0.0343** 0.0257* 
  (0.0120) (0.0117) (0.0140) (0.0145) 
  × second quartile indicator  -0.00250 0.0155 0.0272* 0.0155 
  (0.0123) (0.0143) (0.0139) (0.0155) 
  × third quartile indicator  -0.000464 0.0165 0.0278 0.0307 
  (0.0177) (0.0144) (0.0171) (0.0203) 
      
Controls, Fixed Effects, Trends √ √ √ √ √ 
Additional quartile trend controls   √  √ 
      
Observations 44,140 44,140 44,140 44,140 44,140 
Adj. R-squared 0.985 0.985 0.985 0.985 0.985 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at planning authority level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table 
tests for non-linearities in quartiles of extent of preservation policies. In Columns 2 and 3, the second row is the 
implied effect of CAs on the energy price elasticity for neighbourhoods in the top quartile (most CAs) while 
interaction effects are the additional effect in lower quartiles. In Columns 4 and 5, the first row is the implied 
effect of Listed per 100 dwellings on the energy price elasticity for neighbourhoods in the top quartile (most 
Listed) while interaction effects are the additional effect in lower quartiles.  Additional quartile trend controls are 
interactions between a quartile indicator and (a) region trends (b) rural-urban trends and (c) income trends.   
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Web Appendix Table 4 
Baseline, full results: OLS 
 
   
 Coefficient Standard error 
Log lagged energy price × Listed 0.0199*** (0.00444) 
Log lagged energy price × CA 0.0164*** (0.00350) 
Log lagged energy price × Dist 
commuting zone 
-0.0055* (0.00305) 
   
Log planning authority wages  -0.0133 (0.02032) 
   
Trend × share built pre 1900 0.0323*** (0.00390) 
Trend × share built 1900-1918 0.0280*** (0.00344) 
Trend × share built 1919-1929 0.0273*** (0.00404) 
Trend × share built 1930-1939 0.0341*** (0.00322) 
Trend × share built 1945-1964 0.0003*** (0.00004) 
Trend × share built 1965-1982 0.0004*** (0.00004) 
Trend × share built 1983-1999 0.0004*** (0.00004) 
   
Trend × share flat -0.0001** (0.00003) 
Trend × share terrace -0.0001*** (0.00002) 
Trend × share semi-detached -0.0000 (0.00002) 
   
Trend × degree share 2001 -0.0001 (0.00008) 
Trend × lone parent share 2001 -0.0018*** (0.00032) 
Trend × SOC A share 2001 0.0000 (0.00006) 
Trend × employed share 2001 -0.0003*** (0.00007) 
Trend × homeownership share 2001 -0.0001 (0.00003) 
Trend × ethnicity white share 2001 0.0001*** (0.00003) 
Trend × middle aged share 2001 0.0000 (0.00015) 
Trend × sixty or above share 2001 -0.0001 (0.00005) 
   
Trend × avg net h’hold income in 2004 0.0000*** (0.00001) 
   
Trend × East Midlands 0.0088*** (0.00183) 
Trend × East of England 0.0007 (0.00083) 
Trend × London 0.0032* (0.00191) 
Trend × North East 0.0023 (0.00159) 
Trend × North West 0.0018 (0.00215) 
Trend × South East 0.0033 (0.00229) 
Trend × West Midlands 0.0033*** (0.00110) 
   
Trend × Rural town and fringe 0.0030*** (0.00093) 
Trend × Urban city and town 0.0005 (0.00094) 
Trend × Urban major conurbation 0.0009 (0.00107) 
   
Observations 40,410  
Adj. R-squared 0.985  
Notes: Standard errors clustered at planning authority level in parentheses, *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Web Appendix Table 5 
Robustness planning authority regressions: OLS 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep Var: All installations Normalised by home count Log ratio 
       
Log lagged energy price × Listed -8.118***  -7.186*** -0.249***  -0.228*** 
 (1.095)  (1.189) (0.0394)  (0.0433) 
Log lagged energy price × CA  -5.934*** -2.113  -0.171*** -0.0497 
  (1.250) (1.340)  (0.0453) (0.0486) 
       
Main controls √ √ √ √ √ √ 
       
Observations 1510 1510 1510 1510 1510 1510 
Adj. R-squared 0.978 0.976 0.978 0.980 0.979 0.980 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at planning authority level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Web Appendix Table 6 
Planning authority regressions: IV 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep Var: Log domestic energy 
consumption per person  
Reduced Form IV: 2nd stage 
       
Log lagged energy price × Listed 0.0216***  0.0127***    
 (0.00444)  (0.00485)    
Log lagged energy price × CA  0.0269*** 0.0202***    
  (0.00438) (0.00515)    
Total installations/1000    -0.00204*** -0.00300*** -0.00229*** 
    (0.000523) (0.000903) (0.000547) 
       
Main controls √ √ √ √ √ √ 
       
Observations 1510 1510 1510 1510 1510 1510 
Adj. R-squared 0.975 0.975 0.978 0.935 0.891 0.926 
Kleibergen-Paap    21.025 14.137 22.697 
       
Dep Var: Total installations/1000     IV: 1st stage 
 
 
       
Log lagged energy price × Listed    -10.60***  -8.697*** 
    (2.333)  (2.464) 
Log lagged energy price × CA     -8.968*** -4.353* 
     (2.397) (2.525) 
       
Main controls    √ √ √ 
       
Observations    1510 1510 1510 
Adj. R-squared    0.675 0.675 0.680 
       
Notes: Standard errors clustered at planning authority level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
